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A WELL-REGULATED MILITIA: THE FOUNDING FATHERS
AND THE ORIGIN OF GUN CONTROL IN AMERICA
By Saul Cornell.t New York: Oxford University Press, 2006. Pp. 277. $30.00
David T. Hardy*
"Every thing of a controvertible nature," James Madison noted regarding his
proposed Bill of Rights, "was studiously avoided."' We may wonder what he would
think of the 217 years of controversy that followed.
For most provisions of the Bill of Rights, the controversies have focused upon
their boundaries and limitations. What is an "unreasonable search," a "compelled"
self-incrimination, an "establishment" of religion? In the case of the Second Amend-
ment' the dispute is far more fundamental, going to the very question of whether it
has any meaningful existence. Here, the conflict has been one between variants of
two viewpoints:
(1) the "individual rights" view,3 which has two variants:
(a) The "standard model," which sees the Second Amend-
ment as guaranteeing a personal right on par with other
Bill of Rights protections;
(b) What I have termed the "hybrid" view, which sees it as
guaranteeing an individual right but limited to private
bearing of arms suited for military or militia use;4 and
(2) the "collective rights" view which likewise has two variants:
(a) The traditional "collective rights" approach, which sees
the amendment as protecting only a state interest in an
organized militia, i.e., National Guard units;5 and
t Associate Professor of History, Ohio State University.
* J.D., University of Arizona, 1975.
Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (June 30, 1789), in 12 THE PAPERS
OF JAMES MADISON 272 (Charles F. Hobson & Robert A. Rutland eds., 1979).
2 "A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of
the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed." U.S. CONST. amend. II. The amend-
ment's text is also found in variations with one or two commas. David T. Hardy, Armed
Citizens, Citizen Armies: Toward a Jurisprudence of the Second Amendment, 9 HARv. J.L.
& PUB. POL'Y 559, 560 n.8 (1986).
3 Id. at 560.
4 Id. at 618. This derives from state decisions of the nineteenth century, largely involving
bans on weapons other than firearms such as the Bowie knife and brass knuckles. See, e.g.,
Fife v. State, 31 Ark. 455, 460 (1876); Andrews v. State, 50 Tenn. (3 Heisk.) 165, 186-87
(1871); English v. State, 35 Tex. 473, 476-77 (1872).
5 The Ninth Circuit has carried this view to its logical consequence, holding that no
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(b) What the Fifth Circuit has termed the "sophisticated"
collective rights approach, which sees it as protecting
individual activity but only if directly linked to organized
militia missions.6
As the first view treats the Second Amendment as a meaningful restriction on legis-
lative action, while the second treats it as fundamentally meaningless,7 the conflict
is absolute.
The history of the understanding of the American right to arms has followed
an unusual course in which the advantage swayed back and forth between the two
schools of thought. At its outset, the existence of an individual right was taken for
granted by courts,' commentators, 9 and the general public' throughout the eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries. The collective rights view was first enunciated, by a state
court, in 1905." In 1939, the United States Supreme Court declined to accept that ap-
proach in United States v. Miller; 12 soon thereafter, however, two Circuits read Miller
either as endorsing the collective rights approach 3 or as setting only a threshold test
individual has standing to assert a Second Amendment violation because it is a right of states
only. Hickman v. Block, 81 F.3d 98, 103 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 912 (1996).
6 United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203,219,226 (5th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 536 U.S.
907 (2002).
7 See Glenn Harlan Reynolds & Don B. Kates, The SecondAmendment and States'Rights:
A Thought Experiment, 36 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1737, 1739 (1995).
' See Scott v. Sanford (Dred Scott), 60 U.S. 393,420 (1856), supercededon other grounds
by constitutional amendment, U.S. CONST. amends. XIII & XIV; State v. Reid, 1 Ala. 612,
616-17 (1840); Bliss v. Commonwealth, 12 Ky. (2 Litt.) 90, 92 (1822). See generally infra
text accompanying notes 246-60.
9 See infra notes 188-232 and accompanying text.
10 For the most exhaustive discussion of the public perception over this period, see David
B. Kopel, The Second Amendment in the Nineteenth Century, 1998 BYU L. REv. 1359,
1397-408, 1435-43, 1468-505.
" City of Salina v. Blaksley, 83 P. 619, 620-21 (Kan. 1905). An early mention of the
approach occurred in a concurrence in State v. Buzzard, 4 Ark. 18, 30-32 (1842) (Dickinson,
J., concurring).
12 307 U.S. 174 (1939). The firearm at issue in Miller was a shotgun with a barrel less than
eighteen inches long. Id. at 175. After noting that the right to arms must be construed with a
view to the militia purpose (with the militia described in colonial terms as the armed commu-
nity), the Court declined to take judicial notice that such a firearm was suitable for militia
use, and remanded. Id. at 178, 183. This places Miller in the hybrid individual rights camp: an
individual may assert the right, but it does not cover weapons suited for brawls rather than
militia use. See United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 224-26 (5th Cir. 2001), cert. denied,
536 U.S. 907 (2002). The collective rights approach was briefed by the government, as its
primary position, but was not adopted by the Court. Brannon P. Denning, Can the Simple
Cite Be Trusted?: Lower Court Interpretations of United States v. Miller and the Second
Amendment, 26 CUMB. L. REv. 961, 974-75 (1996).
13 See United States v. Tot, 131 F.2d 261, 266 (3d Cir. 1942), rev'd on other grounds,
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that permitted them to go farther and accept such an approach. 4 Most of the re-
maining circuits followed, 5 and this reading of Miller became a matter of "received
wisdom" to the point in which some decisions suggest the authors had not bothered
to read Miller before interpreting it. 16
Even as late as the early 1960s, Supreme Court justices and an
article selected by the American Bar Foundation as the winner of
its constitutional law essay competition were willing to acknowl-
edge the essentially individual nature of the right protected by
the Second Amendment, but that changed by the end of the
1960s....
It is fair to say that by the 1970s the collective or states' rights
theory had won the day with mostjurists and legal and lay com-
mentators who opined on the issue.... Throughout the 1970s and
1980s, expressed opinion on the part of the elite bar, the bench,
and the legal academy was firmly on the side of those who denied
the existence of an individual right to arms.'17
The tide was, however, changing once again. When first I published on the sub-
ject in 1974,18 there were but a few scholarly treatments in print and none of any par-
ticular depth.' 9 Over the next decade, scholarship in the field expanded, largely as a
result of the efforts of Stephen Halbrook, the late David Caplan, and Joyce Malcolm. 20
319 U.S. 463 (1943).
14 See Cases v. United States, 131 F.2d 916, 922 (1st Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 319 U.S.
770 (1943).
'" See, e.g., Quilici v. Vill. of Morton Grove, 695 F.2d 261, 270 (7th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 863 (1983); United States v. Warin, 530 F.2d 103, 106 (6th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 426 U.S. 948 (1976); United States v. Johnson, 497 F.2d 548, 550 (4th Cir. 1974).
16 A conspicuous example is Hickman v. Block in which the Ninth Circuit, in purporting
to apply Miller, describes Miller as having been convicted and the Supreme Court as having
upheld the conviction. 81 F.3d 98, 101 (9th Cir. 1996). In fact, Miller had secured a dismissal
of his indictment, and the Supreme Court reversed and remanded. Miller, 307 U.S. at 177, 183.
"7 Eugene Volokh et al., The SecondAmendment as Teaching Tool in Constitutional Law
Classes, 48 J. LEGAL EDUC. 591, 606-07 (1998).
18 David T. Hardy & John Stompoly, Of Arms and the Law, 51 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 62
(1974).
'9 See John Levin, The Right to BearArms: The Development of the American Experience,
48 CH.-KENTL. REv. 148 (1971); Robert A. Sprecher, The LostAmendment, 51 A.B.A.J. 554
(1965); Jonathan A. Weiss, A Reply to Advocates of Gun-Control Law, 52 J. URB. L. 577
(1974).
20 See, e.g., David I. Caplan, Restoring the Balance: The Second Amendment Revisited,
5 FoRDHAM URB. L.J. 31 (1976); Stephen P. Halbrook, To Keep and Bear Their Private Arms:
The Adoption of the Second Amendment, 1787-1791, 10 N. KY. L. REv. 13 (1982); Joyce
Lee Malcolm, The Right of the People to Keep and BearArms: The Common Law Tradition,
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In 1983, Don Kates published a lengthy breakthrough article in the Michigan Law
Review.2 ' Thereafter, scholarly treatment of the individual rights approach grew ex-
ponentially. 22 By the 1990s, the individual rights approach had the endorsement of
the major names in constitutional law-William Van Alstyne,23 Sanford Levinson,24
Akhil Amar,25 Leonard Levy,26 and Laurence Tribe.27
It is probably not too much to say that by the 1990s the collective rights view had
become intellectually untenable. While judicial acceptance of this trend was still
largely withheld, the Fifth Circuit, in United States v. Emerson,28 and later, the D.C.
Circuit, in Parker v. District of Columbia,29 did take the individual rights approach,
creating a deep split among the circuits that stands to this day.3°
Now into the fray comes Professor Saul Cornell's book, A Well-Regulated
Militia: The Founding Fathers and the Origins of Gun Control in America
(AWRM). 3' AWRM rejects the collective rights view, but it also rejects a broad
10 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 285 (1983).
21 Don B. Kates, Jr., Handgun Prohibition and the Original Meaning of the Second
Amendment, 82 MICH. L. REV. 204 (1983).
22 See, e.g., STEPHEN P. HALBROOK, THAT EVERY MAN BE ARMED: THE EVOLUTION OF
A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT (2d ed. 1994); JOYCE LEE MALCOLM, To KEEP AND BEAR ARMS:
THE ORIGINS OF AN ANGLO-AMERICAN RIGHT (1994); Robert J. Cottrol & Raymond T.
Diamond, The Second Amendment: Toward an Afro-Americanist Reconsideration, 80 GEO.
L.J. 309 (199 1); Nicholas J. Johnson, Beyond the Second Amendment: An Individual Right
to Arms Viewed Through the Ninth Amendment, 24 RUTGERS L.J. 1 (1992); Nelson Lund,
The Second Amendment, Political Liberty, and the Right to Self-Preservation, 39 ALA. L.
REV. 103 (1987); Robert J. Cottrol & Raymond T. Diamond, The Fifth Auxiliary Right, 104
YALE L.J. 995 (1995) (reviewing MALCOLM, supra); David B. Kopel, It Isn't About Duck
Hunting: The British Origins of the Right to Arms, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1333 (1995) (reviewing
MALCOLM, supra).
23 William Van Alstyne, The SecondAmendment and the PersonalRight to Arms, 43 DUKE
L.J. 1236 (1994).
24 Sanford Levinson, The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 YALE L.J. 637 (1989).
25 AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 50-55,
216-18, 264-66 (1998).
26 LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 133-49 (1999).
27 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 897 (3d ed. 2000).
28 270 F.3d 203 (5th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 536 U.S. 907 (2002); accord United States
v. Darrington, 351 F.3d 632 (5th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 1080 (2004); United States
v. Henry, 288 F.3d 657 (5th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 902 (2002).
29 478 F.3d 370 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
31 See Silveira v. Lockyer, 312 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1046
(2003). The Ninth Circuit is itself divided on the issue. See Nordyke v. King, 364 F.3d 1025
(9th Cir. 2004) (denying rehearing en banc with dissents), cert. denied, 843 U.S. 820 (2004);
Silveira v. Lockyer, 328 F.3d 567 (9th Cir. 2003) (denying rehearing en banc over four dis-
sents); accord United States v. Hale, 978 F.2d 1016, 1021 (8th Cir. 1992) (Beam, J., concur-
ring), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 997 (1993).
31 SAUL CORNELL, A WELL-REGULATED MILITIA: THE FOUNDING FATHERS AND THE
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reading of the individual rights approach.32 It advocates what it terms a "civic
rights" approach, emphasizing the militia-relatedness of the individual right to arms,
and it distinguishes this form of individual right from an individual right to arms based
on individual self-defense-which, it asserts, evolved out of abolitionist writings of
the 1840s and 1850s.33
AWRM seems uncertain as to the practical ramifications that would follow ac-
ceptance of its view. At one point it argues that because militia duties were subject
to regulation, so would be any right to arms: "the original civic conception of the
Second Amendment emphasizes that there can be no right to bear arms without exten-
sive regulation., 34 Elsewhere, AWRM phrases its conclusion in what are virtually
collective-right (or perhaps hybrid-individual right) terms-the purpose of the Second
Amendment was to guarantee that "citizens would be able to keep and bear those arms
needed to... participate in a well-regulated militia.,
35
Professor Cornell's work is, it must be said, an excellent read, and it contains
some interesting revelations that have escaped earlier authors-not all limited to the
right to arms per se. A prominent example is its treatment of the evolution of the
American legal standard for self-defense, shifting from the common law standard of
actual necessity to ward off lethal attack, to the present standard of reasonable belief
of that necessity.3 6 Another interesting revelation takes the form of a detailed outline
of the Grant administration's legal tactics when it set out to prosecute the Ku Klux
Klan under the Fourteenth Amendment and the Enforcement Act-the Grant admin-
istration thought prosecutions of local officials for disarmaments of blacks were sure
winners.37 Yet another gem involves discovering and documenting the role a 1915
Harvard Law Review article played in promoting the collective rights view, lifting
it from its origins in a 1905 Kansas case38 into a doctrine that found broaderjudicial
ORIGINS OF GUN CONTROL IN AMERICA (2006).
32 Id. at 1-3.
31 Id. at 2, 152.
34 Id. at 213.
31 Id. at 2.
36 Id. at 110-17. How juries applied the law is a different question. One study of medieval
verdicts suggests that juries found self-defense if there was any conceivable ground for it
and quite often when there was none. Thomas A. Green, The Jury and the English Law of
Homicide, 1200-1600,74 MICH. L. REV. 413,427,429-30 (1976). In some periods, as much
as fifty-nine percent of homicide prosecutions ended in self-defense rulings. Id. at 430. The
common law also recognized a broad privilege to use deadly force against criminal intruders,
whether or not they posed a threat. See David I. Caplan & Sue Wimmershoff-Caplan, Post-
modernism and the Model Penal Code v. the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments-and
the Castle Privacy Doctrine in the Twenty-First Century, 73 UMKC L. REV. 1073, 1082,
1084-86 (2005).
" CORNELL, supra note 31, at 179-86.
38 City of Salina v. Blacksley, 83 P. 619 (Kan. 1905).
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acceptance.39 Not to mention AWRM's discussion of post-Civil War efforts to create
black militias,4° which has received scant attention in recent decades."
As legal history, however, AWRM has a shortcoming, and it goes to its core.
AWRM does not prove its thesis because it gives only a partial, selective, and often
unreliable account of the development of the American right to arms. As will be de-
tailed infra, early Americans agreed that they had a right to arms, but in discussing
that right, gave different understandings of its purposes and value. Many saw it as
enabling a fundamental natural right of self-defense,: some saw it as enabling a militia
system, 43 and some saw it as ensuring an armed citizenry that-whether enrolled in
militia units or not-would serve as a counterbalance to government abuses.44 The
relative balance of these views follows a timeline. Prior to the Revolution, natural
rights and self-defense overwhelmingly dominated the conversation.45 From 1775 to
the framing of the Constitution, when conflict and state-building were the issues of
the day, natural rights, militia, and armed people were all in play.46 By the framing
of the Bill of Rights and in the following decades, natural right and self-defense
returned to dominance.47
AWRM portrays this historical background as uni-dimensional. It sets out with
its conclusion: almost all early Americans before saw the right as militia-centricn-at
least until the abolitionists came upon the scene-and then is forced to make the his-
torical evidence fit.
Often it is a hard fit. At one point, the reader is informed that "Pennsylvania
in its Declaration of Rights... affirmed that 'the people have a right to bear arms
for the defense of themselves and the state,"' and on the next page assured that
"[n]one of the early state constitutions adopted language protecting an individual
right to keep or carry arms for personal self-defense."'49 References to the right as de-
rived from a natural right of self-defense are simply omitted when they are in irrec-
oncilable conflict with the desired conclusion, and they are recast when the conflict
seems explicable. In the process, AWRM too often pushes the historical record, down
'9 CORNELL, supra note 31, at 198-203.
40 Id. at 175-78.
4 For earlier treatment of the subject, see PETER CAMEJO, RACISM, REVOLUTION,
REACTION, 1861-1877 (1976); OTIs A. SINGLETARY, NEGRO MIITIA AND RECONSTRUCTION
(Greenwood Press 1984) (1957).
42 See infra Part I.A.
41 See infra notes 112-15 and accompanying text.
44 See infra notes 126-31 and accompanying text.
41 See infra Part I.A.
46 See infra Part I.B-C.
47 See infra Part II.
48 See CORNELL, supra note 3 1, at x-xi.
49 Id. at 16, 17.
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to making an authority militia-centric by omitting what he said about the Second
Amendment and substituting what he said about Article I's Militia Clauses.5"
Before detailing AWRM's difficulties, I would renew an observation I have
previously made: there is really no basis for assuming the Second Amendment had
a single objective, that it must have been meant to protect the militia as a system or
to protect an individual right to arms.51 It has two clauses, after all. Is it likely that
the First Congress, when it cut Madison's proposal for the amendment from forty-
six to twenty-four words,52 would have left in a ten or a fourteen-word redundancy?
Would it even have retained a preface, given that it struck Madison's preface to
freedom of the press,53 unless the prefatory and the substantial clauses were seen as
independent provisos?
Indeed, an inquiry into the language chosen for arms/militia guarantees over
the period 1776 to 1787 shows that the choice originally was seen as either/or, with
Classical Republican drafters, strongly focused on creating a stable republic, memori-
alizing the militia, and proto-Jeffersonians, more concerned with individual rights,
guaranteeing individual rights to arms. 4 Only in the Virginia ratifying convention
of 1788 did the two groups unite and agree to recognize both the importance of the
militia and the right of the people to arms.55 It is thus critical to recognize that evi-
dence showing some Framers spoke of any one purpose is not proof that no other
purpose was intended.
In this aspect, both individual rights and collective rights scholars have been both
partially mistaken and partially correct. To make their cases, each has been driven
to assume that the Framers who spoke of the other view were simply being imprecise
or inarticulate. Neither considered the possibility that when Virginia praised the
militia,56 and Pennsylvania guaranteed "a right to bear arms for defense of [one]self
and the State, 57 each meant exactly what they said: they were speaking of somewhat
different things.
AWRM marks a break away from the simple "collective rights only" and "indi-
vidual rights only" dichotomy. At the same time, it tends to fall into a variation of
it, advocating what we might term a "civic right only" view and overlooking the fact
that many Framers and their contemporaries did view the right to arms as related to
personal self-defense.
o See infra notes 197-206 and accompanying text.
51 David T. Hardy, The Second Amendment and the Historiography of the Bill ofRights,
4 J.L. & POL. 1 (1987).
52 Id. at 3 n.5.
" Id. at 59 n.261.
14 See id. at 33-43.
11 Id. at 52.
56 Id. at 34.
17 Id. at 38.
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Moreover, a closer look at the historical evidence indicates that even "civic right"
Framers are divisible into two classes. The first indeed looked to the militia system
as a guarantee of freedom. The second spoke of general armament of the people
as the primary guarantee.58 AWRM, in delineating its concept of a civic right to arms,
conflates the two. It defines "civic right" in terms of the first, militia-centric view-
point.59 But in arguing for this conclusion, it includes evidence relating to the latter
view. Noah Webster wrote that "[b]efore a standing army can rule, the people must
be disarmed; as they are in almost every kingdom in Europe" and that the proposed
Constitution was no peril to liberty since "the whole body of the people are armed."'
A WRM assures us he meant this as praise of the militia system.6 But Webster never
mentioned the militia system in his pamphlet-his references were to widespread
private arms ownership.
The difference is a material one. Part of AWRM's argument is that if the right
to arms is purely militia-related, then fairly extensive government controls would be
permissible.62 If, on the other hand, the Framers saw the right as guaranteeing that
an armed populace would keep the government in check, we might turn a much more
skeptical eye toward assertions of governmental power. The distinction between the
militia-centric viewpoint, and one valuing an armed people, thus goes to the very heart
of A WRM's practical utility as a legal history.
These are aspects of a more fundamental problem in A WRM' s analysis. Dive
bomber pilots long ago discovered the dangers of "target fixation" in which the pilot
became so focused upon his target that he noticed nothing else-including the ap-
proaching ground. AWRM displays an analogous fixation. It seems at times as if
AWRM began with a dogmatic belief that any intelligent Framer must have "civic
right only" in mind; thus any writings which seem to vary from this either (a) had
58 Joyce Lee Malcolm, That Every Man Be Armed: The Evolution of a Constitutional Right,
54 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 452, 455 (1986) (book review) ("The Second Amendment reflects
traditional English attitudes toward these three distinct, but intertwined, issues: the right of
the individual to protect his life, the challenge to government of an armed citizenry, and the
preference for a militia over a standing army.").
59 See, e.g., CORNELL, supra note 31, at 14 ("This ancient right was not exercised by indi-
viduals acting unilaterally or in isolation, but rather required that citizens act together in concert
as part of a well-regulated militia."); id. at 41 (claiming that the dominant early model of right
"tied the exercise of this right to participation in the militia"). But see id. at 2 ('The original
understanding [was] a civic right that guaranteed that citizens would be able to keep and bear
those arms needed to meet their legal obligation to participate in a well-regulated militia.").
The first two formulations approach the collective right theory; the third greatly resembles
the hybrid individual right view.
60 NOAH WEBSTER, AN EXAMINATION INTO THE LEADING PRINCIPLES OF THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION PROPOSED BY THE LATE CONVENTION HELD AT PHILADELPHIA 43 (Phila.,
Prichard & Hall 1787).
61 CORNELL, supra note 31, at 47.
62 Id. at 212-13.
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civic right in mind but neglected to mention it or (b) can be disregarded because the
author was a dunce who failed to grasp what he should have been saying.
Thus when Massachusetts in 1780 guaranteed a right to keep and bear arms "for
the common defense," AWRM sees this as a critical development, "linking the right
to keep arms with the obligation to bear them for the common defense. 63 Yet when
the First U.S. Senate voted down a similar addition to the Second Amendment,'
AWRM sees it as a matter of little consequence.65
The Pennsylvania minority at its ratifying convention demanded a guarantee of
a very broad right to arms, that "the people have a right to bear arms for the defence
of themselves and their own State or the United States, or for the purpose of killing
game."66 AWRM sees the inclusion of hunting as the product of "slapdash draftsman-
ship. 67 Yet when the New Hampshire ratifiers called for a guarantee that "Congress
shall never disarm any Citizen unless such as are or have been in Actual Rebellion," 6
A WRM treats the omission of hunting as proof the convention must have been thinking
of arms for militia purposes only: "[h]ad New Hampshire sought such a personal
right, the state could have easily followed the model provided by the Pennsylvania
Dissent and included a provision on hunting. '69 At times we are left to wonder what
an eighteenth century American could have written, said, or done thatA WRM would
not read as support of a "civic right only" approach.7 °
At other points AWRM dons blinders when it encounters evidence of non-militia
intent. Previous authors have noted four great legal commentators of the eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries who discussed the American right to arms: St. George
Tucker, William Rawle, Joseph Story, and Thomas Cooley.7 Tucker and Rawle dis-
cussed the right to arms as purely individual;72 Cooley saw it as militia-related but re-
pudiated the claim that it had any limitation to militia duty.73 Only Story discussed
the right to arms purely as militia-related.74
63 Id. at 24.
64 JOURNAL OF THE FIRST SESSION OF THE SENATE 77 (Gales & Seaton 1820) (1789)
[hereinafter SENATE JOURNAL].
61 CORNELL, supra note 31, at 62.
66 PENNSYLVANIA AND THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 1787-1788, at 462 (John Bach
McMaster & Frederick D. Stone eds., 1888).
67 CORNELL, supra note 31, at 51-52.
68 2 BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THEBILLOFRIGHTS: ADOCUMENTARY HISTORY 761 (1971).
69 CORNELL, supra note 3 1, at 59.
70 As it is, there is one thing no eighteenth-century American did, and it is the only measure
that would clearly prove A WRM's "civic right only" theme. None said anything approaching
"this right to arms is intended for militia purposes alone."
71 See, e.g., HALBROOK, supra note 22, at 89-93, 169; DAVID T. HARDY, ORIGINS AND
DEVELOPMENTOFTHESECOND AMENDMENT 80-85 (1986); Kopel, supra note 10, at 1372-79,
1384-97, 1461-66.
72 See discussion infra Part II.A. 1-2.
73 See discussion infra Part II.A.4.
4 See discussion infra Part II.A.3.
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This presents a serious problem for A WRM's thesis, and to deal with itAWRM
becomes quite disingenuous. It omits Rawle and Cooley entirely. It praises Tucker but
inexplicably omits his discussion of the Second Amendment and quotes only from his
discussion of Article I's Militia Clauses,75 which predictably dealt with the militia.76
Part I of this Review will examine A WRM's treatment of the right to arms under
the Second Amendment, which exhibits a tendency to stress militia-related writings,
to play down other evidence, and to overlook subtle differences in the treatment of
rights to arms. Part RI will examine its treatment of the commentators and caselaw in
the early Republic in which it shows more serious flaws, down to omitting data which
is inconsistent with its thesis, and describing as the majority view a position that was
in fact only accepted by a single court. Part III will examine AWRM's analysis of the
Fourteenth Amendment, and Part IV will analyze the role of A WRM' s thesis on con-
stitutional interpretation and on public policy.
I. A WRM's TREATMENT OF THE BACKGROUND OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT
A. A Problem of Missing Context
Most ofA WRM' s treatment of the early period of American law overlaps efforts
of prior authors, particularly Stephen Halbrook, Don Kates, and David Kopel." At
this point in time, duplication is almost inevitable: after thirty years of industrious
digging, there are few nuggets left to be found and, as noted above, when they remain,
A WRM does find them. Before examining its treatment of sources from that period,
however, it is worthwhile to note the lack of an important context.
AWRM's focus is upon the development of the American right to arms, and it
almost entirely omits treatment of the prior development of a British right to arms.
The rights-consciousness of early America grew, of course, from the seed of British
concepts, particularly those of the Whig theorists.78 In 1789, Americans did not invent
from thin air the ideas of freedom of the press, freedom from general warrants, rights
to a jury trial, or a right to arms.
As Joyce Malcolm has extensively documented,79 the British right to arms arose
out of a popular reaction to arms confiscations by the Stuart monarchs and was en-
shrined in the 1688 Declaration of Rights, which recognized among the "auntient and
indubitable Rights" of Britons that "the Subjects which are Protestants may have
75 U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cls. 15-16.
76 See infra notes 188-206 and accompanying text.
77 At first glance, I thoughtA WRM had made a major discovery: James Madison had used
"bear arms" in drafting a bill regulating hunting, i.e., in a non-military context. CORNELL, supra
note 31, at 29. But Stephen Halbrook had found this too. See HALBROOK, supra note 22, at 223
n.145.
78 CORNELL, supra note 31, at 28-34; Hardy, supra note 2, at 584-87.
79 See MALCOLM, supra note 22.
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Arms for their Defence suitable to their Conditions and as allowed by Law."80 The
Parliamentary debates on the Declaration show members complaining of seizures
of private arms, by militia officials, under the 1662 Militia Act8' and that the House
of Lords struck "for the common defense" from the end of the provision. 2 The
English right, as recognized in the Declaration, had no militia orientation-if any-
thing, it had an anti-militia slant, denouncing the acts of militia leaders, which had
been authorized under militia statutes. Indeed, one British military historian has com-
plained, "[t]he revised wording suggested only that it was lawful to keep a blunder-
buss to repel burglars. 83
Blackstone's authoritative treatment of English law cited the Declaration and
classed its right to arms as an auxiliary right' that protected the subject against a day
when the failure of legal protections made either resistance, or self-defense, essen-
tial-in short, as a broad principle of self-defense, with no reference to militia service:
The fifth and last auxiliary right of the subject, that I shall at pres-
ent mention, is that of having arms for their defence, suitable to
their condition and degree, and such as are allowed by law. Which
is also declared by the same statute and is indeed a public allow-
ance, under due restrictions, of the natural right of resistance and
self-preservation, when the sanctions of society and laws are
found insufficient to restrain the violence of oppression.85
In this, Blackstone harkens back to Thomas Hobbes, who had made the right of self-
defense the one inalienable right, precisely because the subject had submitted to the
sovereign in exchange for protection against private violence: the subject could not
bargain away the one thing he had received in the exchange.86
80 Declaration of Rights, 1688, 1 W. & M., c. 2 (Eng.).
81 Hardy, supra note 2, at 582-83. The 1662 Act authorized any Lord Lieutenant of the
militia, or any two of his deputies, to disarm anyone they "judge[d] dangerous to the Peace
of the Kingdome." Militia Act, 1662, 14 Car. 2, c. 3, § 8 (Eng.).
82 Hardy, supra note 2, at 582-83.
83 J.R. WESTERN, MONARCHY AND REVOLUTION: THE ENGLISH STATE IN THE 1680s, at
339 (1972).
84 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 139 (Univ. Chi.
Press, photo. reprinted 1979) (1765). Blackstone considered the absolute rights of Englishmen
to be personal security, personal liberty, and private property. Id. at 125. These were backed
by "auxiliary subordinate rights of the subject, which serve principally as barriers to protect
and maintain inviolate the three great and primary rights." Id. at 136. The auxiliary rights were
the powers given Parliament, the limitations on the royal prerogative, the right to seek judicial
remedy, the right to petition, and the right to arms. Id. at 136-39.
85 Id. at 139 (citations omitted).
86 THOMAS HOBBES, THE LEVIATHAN 68 (Prometheus Books 1988) (1651). Blackstone,
in tum, wrote that "[f]or whatever is done by a man, to save either life or member, is looked
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A WRM virtually omits the English experience, devoting but three sentences to
the Declaration 8T-and at that, quoting the relevant sentence only in part8 -before
assuring the reader that early Bostonians put a militia gloss upon the right to arms
by noting it was well-suited for defense of the community. 9 Of Blackstone, we are
told little more than that he must have thought the Declaration of Rights and self-
defense were distinct, since he writes of self-defense separately (which is neither
correct-he discusses the right of self defense in the same chapter as the right to
arms-nor dispositive-he discusses the legal elements of self-defense elsewhere,
but he does the same with the importance of the militia9 °) and that, since Blackstone
also treated the right to petition as an auxiliary right, both rights must be "essentially
political."'" Blackstone's reference to "self-preservation" as the purpose of the right
goes by the wayside.
In short, the Anglo-American concept of the right saw it as related to self-defense,
which in turn had two aspects: individual self-defense against criminals and collective
self-defense against a tyrannical government. Both were outgrowths of a fundamental
right to self-defense,92 and both were, to Blackstone, defenses against "oppression."93
By focusing only upon the American experience, A WRM overlooks its underpin-
nings as an auxiliary of self-defense.
upon as done upon the highest necessity and compulsion." 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 84,
at 126.
87 CORNELL, supra note 31, at 12.
88 Id. A WRM states that early colonists believed they had a right to "have arms for their
defenses," based on the Declaration. Id. It then quotes the Declaration proviso as "the subjects
being Protestant may have arms for their defense," omitting the "suitable to their conditions"
provisio, which emphasizes the personal nature of the right. Id. It then quotes Sam Adams's
discussion of Blackstone. Id. at 14.
As I point out in Part I.B infra, Adams's discussion sounds as if it refers to political
resistance, but it actually referred to individual defense against street criminals who happened
to be enlisted in the British army.
89 CORNELL, supra note 31, at 12-14.
90 Blackstone extensively discusses self-defense as one of the principle "absolute rights."
1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 84, at 19-26. Indeed it is the first aspect of personal security, which
in turn is the first right discussed. Id. at 125. Later he discusses the right to arms as an "auxiliary
right," one of those meant to safeguard the absolute rights. Id. at 139. He discusses the militia
in Volume I, id. at 397-405, and self-defense as a criminal defense in Volume IV, chapter 14,.
4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 84, at 183-88.
91 CORNELL, supra note 31, at 15. We may note that this implies the right of association
is also "essentially political."
92 See Don B. Kates, Jr., The Second Amendment and the Ideology of Self-Protection, 9
CONST. COMMENT. 87 (1992).
93 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 84, at 218 ("[A]ll kinds of crimes of a public nature, all
disturbances of the peace, all oppressions, and other misdemeanors whatsoever... may be
indicted .. " (emphasis added)).
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A more careful attention to Blackstone and to the British legal authorities might
have prevented some errors from creeping into AWRM. We are told, for instance, that
"[u]nder British law one could not travel armed, and the mere possession of arms
likely to provoke a public panic was also punishable."' In fact, while there had been
a 1328 statute forbidding riding while armed,95 it appears to have been universally
ignored. When James II prosecuted a political enemy for taking weapons into a
church in 1687, the King's Bench acquitted him, noting "a general connivance to gen-
tlemen to ride armed for their security,"96 and adding that the law was only meant
to forbid going armed with intent "to terrify the King's subjects."97 Along the same
lines, the power of authorities to disarm those involved in an "affray" is treated in
A WRM as if it were broad power, with the note that a hunting party would not "under
most circumstances" constitute an affray.98 A reference to Blackstone would have
shown that an affray was "the fighting of two or more persons in some public place,
to the terror of his majesty's subjects," distinguished from ordinary assault by the
causing of public terror, and from riot by the small number of individuals involved.99
B. AWRM's Treatment of American Revolutionary Thought
If the English right to arms had two aspects, self-defense against criminals and
collective resistance against tyranny, it is not surprising that in the period surround-
ing the American Revolution, the focus of political writers and speakers was largely
upon the second aspect. " General Gage had raided militia supplies at Concord, and
Governor Dunmore had seized the gunpowder at Williamsburg to prevent organized
resistance-not in hopes of freeing colonial burglars from occupational hazards.'0 '
Anti-Federalists during the ratification debates would have been laughed down if they
had argued Congress might use its new-found powers to protect street criminals,
10 2
' CORNELL, supra note 31, at 30.
95 Statute of Northampton, 1328, 2 Edw. 3, c. 3 (Eng.).
96 R v. Knight, (1687) 90 Eng. Rep. 330 (K.B.). "Connivance" today means something
along the lines of conspiracy. At the time, it retained its Latin meaning, literally "to wink at."
9' Sir John Knight's Case, (1686) 87 Eng. Rep. 75,76 (K.B.). The career and prosecution
of the irascible Sir John Knight is documented in MALCOLM, supra note 22, at 104-05. In a
time of deep religious divisions, Knight was a uniter: he managed to annoy both Catholics
and Protestants.
98 CORNELL, supra note 31, at 30.
99 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 84, at 145.
'o See infra note 301 and accompanying text.
101 See generally HALBROOK, supra note 22, at 60-61 (noting 1774 orders to British com-
manders to disarm colonists); MALCOLM, supra note 22, at 145-46.
102 Indeed, given the nature of commerce at the time, it would have been hard to formulate
an argument that the Constitution gave Congress a power to regulate arms making and pos-
session. Muskets were made by local gunsmiths and blacksmiths, and Wickard v. Filburn, 317
U.S. 111 (1942), was far in the future. The Militia Clauses, however, gave Congress the power
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but they could make headway with complaints about powers given Congress over
the militia. 0 3 A WRM makes much of the comparative silence of political speakers
as to self-defense against criminals, but viewed in historical context this remains an
understandable omission, not a repudiation.
Nor are the historical actors entirely silent on that topic, and here AWRM seems
to play down or recast their words to make them fit a "civic rights only" mold.
1. The Early Colonists' Public Writings
Sam Adams and his fellow Bostonian writers, AWRM states, viewed the right to
arms as a civic, militia affair. "o Of Adams's invocation of Blackstone, we are told,
"[t]his ancient right [of resistance and self-preservation] was not exercised by indi-
viduals acting unilaterally or in isolation, but rather required that citizens act together
in concert as part of a well-regulated militia."10' 5
The historical context of Adams's writings is more complex. It must be under-
stood that eighteenth century recruiting practices were directed at finding, not a few
good men, but a lot of bad ones, and jails were a good source of recruits. 6
In 1768, several thousand British troops were dispatched to Boston, where they
were quartered among the population." 7 The city essentially experienced a stunning
increase in its population of street criminals; brawls, robberies, and rapes became
a frequent occurrence.10 8 A British officer's diary reflects the state of affairs:
[H]eard of some robberies committed in the Country, most
probably by some of the Deserters, who will do more harm than
good, as nothing but Rascals go off; serve the Yankys right for
enticing them away.
to prescribe militia organization, arms, and drill, and to call the militia out for specified pur-
poses. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 15-16.
'03 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 15-16,; id. art. II, § 2.
104 CORNELL, supra note 31, at 14.
105 Id.
106 British regiments assigned to the colonies were particularly bad in this regard. The duty
was unattractive and promotion potential limited, so the colonies got the worst men and officers:
"[t]heir ranks were filled with deserters and criminals." THEODOREROPP, WAR IN THEMODERN
WORLD 65 (1981). One colonist described the soldiers as "a dissolute sett of Men" sent to
"deprave the manners of the People." JOHN SHY, TOWARD LEXINGTON: THE ROLE OF THE
BRITISH ARMY IN THE COMING OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 142 (1965).
107 HALBROOK, supra note 22, at 58.
'08 William S. Fields & David T. Hardy, The Third Amendment and the Issue of the Main-
tenance of Standing Armies: A Legal History, 35 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 393, 416-17 (1991).
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Nothing remarkable but the drunkenness among the Soldiers,
which is now got to a very great pitch; owing to the cheapness
of the liquor ....
Last night there was a Riot in King Street in consequence of an
Officer having been insulted by the Watchmen, which has fre-
quently happen'd, as those people suppose from their employ-
ment that they may do it with impunity; the contrary, however,
they experienc'd last night: . . . several Officers drew their
Swords and.., one of the Watch lost a Nose, another a Thumb,
besides many others by the points of Swords .. ..109
Viewed in its entirety, Adams's 1769 article is referring to defense, not against
the official acts of the redcoats, but against their off-duty street criminality:
Instances of the licentious and outrageous behavior of the military
conservators of the peace still multiply upon us, some of which
are of such a nature, and have been carried to so great lengths,
as must serve fully to evince that a late vote of this town, calling
upon the inhabitants to provide themselves with arms for their
defence, was a measure as prudent as it was legal; such violences
are always to be apprehended from military troops, when quar-
tered in the body of a populous city; but more especially so, when
they are led to believe that they are become necessary to awe a
spirit of rebellion, injuriously said to be existing therein. It is a
natural right which the people have reserved to themselves, con-
firmed by the Bill of Rights, to keep arms for their own defence;
and as Mr. Blackstone observes, it is to be made use of when the
sanctions of society and law are found insufficient to restrain
the violence of oppression.11
As if to underscore Adams's point, the next day's issue of the newspaper reported
that two women had been attacked by soldiers and that a postrider had been assaulted
by a pair of officers." 1 AWRM thus errs by treating Adams's invocations of Blackstone
as militia-related. Put in context, Adams is not in 1768 calling upon Bostonians to
109 A British Officer in Boston in 1775, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Apr. 1877, at 393-96,
available athttp://memory.loc.gov/ammen/ndlpcoop/moahtmlltitle/lists/atla_V391234.html
(under "A British Officer in Boston in 1775," click on "view page images" hyperlink). The
scanned text is unreliable; one must resort to the images.
110 BOSTON UNDER MILITARY RULE (1768-1769) AS REVEALED IN A JOURNAL OF THE
TIMES 79 (Oliver Morton Dickerson ed., 1936); see also HALBROOK, supra note 22, at 58.
... Fields & Hardy, supra note 108, at 417.
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rise up in political rebellion against the redcoats, but rather he was justifying their
taking up arms in self-defense against street criminals who happened to be off-duty
soldiers.
2. The Early State Declarations of Rights
a. Virginia, 1776
The first part of the Second Amendment derives from an abbreviated form of
Virginia's 1776 Declaration of Rights, which stated: "a well-regulated militia, com-
posed of the body of the people, trained to arms, is the proper, natural, and safe de-
fence of a free state."'
1 2
This clearly fits a "civic right" or militia-centric approach, and it is not surpris-
ing that AWRM extensively discusses this proviso. AWRM also notes that Thomas
Jefferson unsuccessfully proposed an individual right-"[n]o freeman shall ever be
debarred the use of arms"-which he later revised by adding, or at least considered
adding, "within his own lands or tenaments."' 3 AWRM treats the addition as a sig-
nificant retreat, "effectively eliminating the right to carry arms."' 4 An equally likely
explanation is that the Virginia gentry were constantly trying to stop poaching of
game on their own domains, and "use" of arms on others' land would have protected
illegal hunting."5
But let us break away from "collective right only," "individual right only," and
"civic right only" approaches for a moment. What is most significant of the Virginia
Declaration and of Jefferson's failed proposal is that, taken together, they illustrate
that some early statesmen sought a guarantee of a broad individual right; whereas,
others sought to protect the militia as an institution. In the gentry-dominated politics
of revolutionary Virginia, the latter prevailed, and their product would later become
the model for half, but only half, of the Second Amendment. The model for the other
half was not long delayed.
b. Pennsylvania, 1776
The second half of the amendment derives from a different political act by, in a
literal sense, radically different political actors. Pennsylvania's consent to indepen-
dence had been secured by a dramatic political purge of the pro-British merchant
112 VA. CONST. of 1776, § 13, reprinted in 7 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTrruTIONs 3814
(Francis Thorpe ed., 1909).
113 1 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 344, 353 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1950). The phrase
is bracketed, making it unclear whether Jefferson originally included it, then debated taking
it out, or later debated its inclusion.
" CORNELL, supra note 31, at 20.
". For Washington's efforts against poaching, see 37 THE WRTINGS OF GEORGE
WASHINGTON 194-95 (John C. Fitzpatrick ed., 1940).
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class and the anti-war Quakers.' 16 The political context thus differed greatly from
that of Virginia: Pennsylvania's merchant gentry had been overthrown.
Pennsylvania adopted a Declaration of Rights which John Adams described as
"taken almost verbatim from that of Virginia. 117 "Almost" is an important qualifier,
since the Pennsylvanians made two relevant changes. First, they deleted the Virginia
praise of the militia, and substituted an individual right to arms: "[t]hat the people
have a right to bear arms for the defence of themselves and the state."' 18
Second, they underscored the change by inserting a preamble. The first section
of the Virginia Declaration of Rights, essentially a preamble, mentioned the retention
of certain rights--enjoyment of life, liberty, and property, and the pursuit of "happi-
ness and safety."' 19 To the list the Pennsylvanians added "enjoying and defending
life and liberty, acquiring, possessing and protecting property." 2 0 "Defending life"
and "protecting property" have clearly individual, non-militia connotations.
The combination of section one and a right to arms for self-defense would seem
fairly convincing evidence that the Pennsylvania delegates were concerned with per-
sonal use of arms, specifically for self-defense. If they had been concerned solely
with the militia, they could have retained the Virginia language, as they did with
other rights.
A WRM, however, does its best to explain how the Pennsylvanians really were
thinking about the militia, not about self-defense, even as they wrote about self-
defense and clipped out reference to the militia.
A WRM notes that thirteen years before, Pennsylvania had experienced the Paxton
Boy's Uprising, in which a group of frontiersmen massacred a score of Conestoga
Indians.' 2 ' AWRM points out that one pamphlet defending their actions referred to
the lack of a militia law and used wording that "anticipated the language eventually
included by Pennsylvanians in their Declaration of Rights."' 122 A WRM concludes
that the Pennsylvanians must have meant to safeguard the militia as an institution
when they used the same term: "[t]he language eventually incorporated into the
Pennsylvania Declaration of Rights reflected this bitter struggle over public safety,
and had little to do with public concern over an individual right to keep arms for
self-protection." 123
116 Hardy, supra note 51, at 36-38.
17 John Adams, Diary Entry (June 23, 1779), in DIARY AND AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF JOHN
ADAMS 391 (L.H. Butterfield ed., 1964).
18 PA. CONST. of 1776, § 13, reprinted in 5 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra
note 112, at 3083.
119 VA. CONST. of 1776, § 1, reprinted in 7 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra
note 112, at 3813.
120 PA. CONST. of 1776, § 1, reprinted in 5 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra
note 112, at 3082.
121 CORNELL, supra note 31, at 21.
122 id.
123 Id. at 22.
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An examination of the pamphlet does little to suggest that its authors' language
was appropriated by the Pennsylvania delegates. The relevant part complains of the
indifference of the state legislature:
When we applied to the Government for Relief, the far greater
part of the Assembly were Quakers, some of whom made light
of our Sufferings and plead Conscience, so that they could neither
take Arms in Defense of themselves or their Country, nor form a
Militia Law to oblige the Inhabitants to arms, nor even grant the
King any money to enable his loyal Subjects in the Province to
reduce the common Enemy. 124
The occurrence of "Defense of themselves or their County" in the midst of a rather
obscure125 1764 discussion of Quaker beliefs is not much evidence that the 1776 con-
vention's "the people have a right to bear arms for the defence of themselves and
the state" was based on borrowed language or that the 1776 authors had the Paxton
Boys in mind when they wrote. Moreover, the pamphleteer draws a distinction be-
tween the Quakers not taking up arms themselves, their failure to enact a militia law,
and-in a part omitted by AWRM-their refusal to send money to help the frontiers-
men defend themselves. The complaint is that they would neither take up arms vol-
untarily, form a mandatory militia, nor help individuals defend themselves in the
absence of a mandatory militia system.
c. Massachusetts, 1780
The Massachusetts Declaration of Rights was based on the Pennsylvania model,
with two changes. First, it added "keep" arms, to the right to "bear" them, and second
it added "for the common defence" at the end: "[t]he people have a right to keep and
bear arms for the common defence."' 26 The first addition broadened the right; the
second restricted it. The restriction is consistent with its principal drafter's fear of
mob rule. 127
124 The Apology of the Paxton Volunteers, in THE PAXTON PAPERS 187 (John R. Dunbar
ed., 1957) [hereinafter Apology]. AWRM quotes the passage but omits "nor even grant the
King any money to enable his loyal Subjects in the Province to reduce the common Enemy."
CORNELL, supra note 31, at 21.
125 The modem editor notes that his copy was found in the Historical Society of
Pennsylvania, with worn and water-damaged pages. Apology, supra note 124, at 185 n. 1. The
frequent misspellings (down to "Pinnsylvania") seem suggestive it was not a product of a
skilled Philadelphia press.
126 MASS. CONST. of 1780, pt. I, art. XVII, reprinted in 3 FEDERAL AND STATE
CONSTrTUTIONS, supra note 112, at 1892.
127 John Adams would later write that "[t]o suppose arms in the hands of citizens, to be
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A WRM notes that the "for the common defence" language met opposition in
town assemblies, where fears were expressed that it might allow enactment of laws
requiring public storage of arms but that these protests did not lead to a change in
the language.128 Again, this suggests that there was no single conception of the right
to arms at the time. The Massachusetts drafters may have had a militia-centric view
of the right, but the town assemblies had a broader view. The difference is all the
more important since the First Senate, nine years later, considered a motion to insert
"for the common defence" in the Second Amendment-and voted it down. 129
In its conclusion for this segment, A WRM again drifts toward an all too narrow
"single purpose only" view of the right to arms. We are told that the "civic con-
ception" of the right to arms, related to militia service, was the "dominant model"
of the period. 30 This is probably not inaccurate: the Virginia model is quite civic,
the Pennsylvania model is quite individual, and the Massachusetts model is some-
where in between but tending more toward the civic concept. The civic concept
would have a modest advantage. A more complete comparison would show the
vote-count swaying back and forth over this period.'31 But the critical consideration
is that different groups of Americans were taking two different approaches, and
decades later the First Congress would have to satisfy two constituencies.
C. AWRM's Treatment of the Constitution and the Ratifying Debates
Following the end of the Revolution, it became apparent that the Articles of
Confederation conferred too little power upon the national establishment, and the
Continental Congress authorized a convention to draft amendments to the Articles.132
When the convention decided instead to propose an entirely new constitution, mem-
bers of the state conventions called to ratify the proposal quickly divided into what
used at individual discretion, except in private self-defence, or by partial orders of towns,
counties, or districts of a state, is to demolish every constitution." 6 THE WORKS OF JOHN
ADAMS, SECOND PRESIDENT OFTHE UNITED STATES 197 (Charles Francis Adams ed., Books
for Libraries Press 1969) (1850-1856). It is noteworthy that even Adams listed both self-
defense and militia functions as proper objects of the right to arms.
128 CORNELL, supra note 31, at 24-25.
129 See infra note 174 and accompanying text.
130 CORNELL, supra note 31, at 41.
131 Which view had the numerical superiority would depend upon the year chosen for the
comparison. Maryland (1776) followed the Virginia model, North Carolina (1776) tracked the
Massachusetts one, while the Pennsylvania model was followed in Vermont (1777), Kentucky
(1792), Indiana (1816), Mississippi (1817), and Connecticut (1818). See generally Stephen
P. Halbrook, The Right to Bear Arms in the First State Bills of Rights: Pennsylvania, North
Carolina, Vermont, and Massachusetts, 10 VT. L. REv. 255 (1985); Kopel, supra note 10,
at 1407.
132 See CORNELL, supra note 31, at 40-41.
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would later become known as the Federalist and Anti-Federalist camps.' 33 The first
ratifications were obtained before the Anti-Federalists could muster much support,
but opposition organized quickly thereafter. 
134
The Anti-Federalists soon found a winning argument in the document's lack of
a bill of rights. Some went beyond mere criticism and advanced their own proposals
for such an addition, thus leaving us with rather specific ideas of what each person
or body desired. 135 The great majority of these appear focused on an individual
right to arms for individual purposes, with the remainder invoking both individual
rights and civic purposes. 36 No proposal from this period gave protection of the
militia as the sole purpose of a right to arms, and the majority did not even mention
the militia. 137
Here A WRM seems to give emphasis to the proposals that can be recast to at
least be consistent with a civic or militia concept, and to omit, or play down, those in
which such recasting would be hopeless. We will take these in chronological order.
Samuel Adams, Massachusetts. Adams unsuccessfully proposed a bill of rights
that included "that the said Constitution be never construed to authorize Congress
to infringe the just liberty of the press, or the rights of conscience; or to prevent
the people of the United States, who are peaceable citizens, from keeping their own
arms," an individual reference. 3 8 This would seem a clear indication that certain
Anti-Federalists were pressing for an individual right, for individual purposes. Al-
though acknowledging Adams as a prominent Anti-Federalist author, 39 AWRM
makes no mention of his proposal.
The Pennsylvania Minority Report. In Pennsylvania, Anti-Federalists formed
a large minority of the delegates and proposed a right to arms. After the convention
ratified without a bill of rights, the minority issued a report on their demands, which
was circulated in other States."4 The Pennsylvania minority demanded:
[t]hat the people have a right to bear arms for the defence of them-
selves and their own State or the United States, or for the purpose
of killing game; and no law shall be passed for disarming the
133 See id. at 41-50.
134 See id. at 41-44.
"' See id. at 45.
136 See id. at 46-50.
131 See id. at 46-65.
13' DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS IN THE CONVENTION OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF
MASSACHUSETrS HELD IN THE YEAR 1788, at 86 (1856). The journal of the convention shows
Adams's proposal losing on a voice vote, id. at 87, while the summary of the debates shows
him withdrawing it, id. at 266. The compilers of the record acknowledged that it had errors
due to their inexperience and difficulty in hearing the proceedings. See id. at xi.
139 CORNELL, supra note 31, at 45.
"4 See Hardy, supra note 51, at 44-45.
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people or any of them unless for crimes committed, or real danger
of public injury from individuals. 141
The Pennsylvania minority report is as clear a statement of individual right for
individual purposes as could be imagined, and it stands as a powerful objection to a
"civic right only" approach to the right to arms. AWRM acknowledges the Pennsylvania
proposal but treats it as inconsequential: it showed "slapdash draftsmanship," no other
proposals used "bear arms" in relation to nonmilitary usages,'42 and the Federalists
did not respond to the relevant passages.'43 But a critique of the Minority's drafting
skill is not a disproof that a growing number of Anti-Federalists-over a third of the
convention-wanted to see a guarantee of an individual right for individual purposes
and that a "civic rights only" explanation is inadequate.
The New Hampshire Majority. New Hampshire gave the Constitution the ninth
ratification it needed before it bound the States already signatory to it. In this con-
vention the proponents of a bill of rights achieved a majority, and Federalists found
they could live with such a proposal-so long as it was not a condition of ratification.
Its ratification thus has a certain unique importance. The New Hampshire convention
called for a guarantee that "Congress shall never disarm any Citizen unless such as
are or have been in Actual Rebellion," 1" again a clearly individual right--down to an
exception for individuals in rebellion-this time demanded by a majority of a rati-
fying convention.
AWRM omits the New Hampshire proposal from its discussion of the ratifying
convention's proposals, then mentions it, in passing, while discussing Madison's later
drafting of the Bill of Rights.14 There, A WRM assures us that since New Hampshire
did not mention hunting, "the primary concern was federalism, not a right to protect
the use of guns for private purposes."1" Apparently, any Framer or convention which
did not mention a constitutional right to hunt is to be classed as a proponent of the
"civic rights only" approach. One is left wondering what is unclear about "Congress
shall never disarm any Citizen except such as are or have been in Actual Rebellion."' 47
141 PENNSYLVANIA AND THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, supra note 66, at 462.
142 AlthoughAWRM acknowledges, earlier, that James Madison himself did so. CORNELL,
supra note 31, at 29; see also United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 231 (5th Cir. 2001),
cert. denied, 536 U.S. 907 (2002).
143 CORNELL, supra note 31, at 52. Yet AWRM itself acknowledges that Federalists were
not responding to the lack of a bill of rights at this point simply because they were winning;
the response came when their cause appeared to be bogging down in Virginia and New York.
Id. at49.
144 2 SCHWARTZ, supra note 68, at 761.
145 CORNELL, supra note 31, at 59.
1' Id.
147 2 SCHWARTZ, supra note 68, at 761.
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Virginia. Virginia's convention followed the New Hampshire approach and rati-
fied with a request for a bill of rights. When it came to the issue of arms, the drafters
made a conceptual breakthrough. There was no need to choose between satisfying
those who wanted to secure the militia and those who wanted to guarantee an indi-
vidual right to arms: they could placate both. Going back to the state declarations
of rights, the Virginians: (1) began with the Pennsylvania/Massachusetts State con-
stitutions' declaration of a "right of the people," (2) retained Masschusetts' s addition
of a right to keep arms but deleted its "common defense" limitation, then (3) attached
their own Declaration of Rights referring to the importance of a well regulated militia.
In so doing, they recognized both the militia concept and the individual rights concept,
and in the broadest terms used to date for each: "[tlhat the people have a right to
keep and bear arms; that a well-regulated militia, composed of the body of the people
trained to arms, is the proper, natural, and safe defence of a free state."' 148
The Virginia language stands as a prominent reminder that some Americans
wanted an individual right for individual purposes, while others wanted a protection
of the militia as a system; drafters of a bill of rights had to satisfy two schools of
thought. George Mason's speech to the convention shows that he was reaching out
to both groups, suggesting that neglect of the militia was a means to a worse end,
disarmament of the people:
Forty years ago, when the resolution of enslaving America was
formed in Great-Britain, the British parliament was advised by
an artful man, who was governor of Pennsylvania, to disarm the
people-that it was the best and most effectual way to enslave
them-but that they should not do it openly; but to weaken them
and let them sink gradually, by totally disusing and neglecting
the militia. 149
Paradoxically, while extensively discussing the debates in the Virginia Convention,15
AWRM does not quote or paraphrase the language that resulted. We are simply as-
sured that "all of the provisions suggested by the Virginia Convention focused on
the militia."''
New York. The New York debates on ratification provide our fullest written
record relating to arms and the militia. This was in good part because, as AWRM
notes,'52 the Federalists realized they were now at a disadvantage and were forced
to counterattack.
148 Id. at 842.
149 DAVID ROBERTSON, DEBATES AND OTHER PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONVENTION OF
VGINIA 270 (2d ed. 1805).
I50 CORNELL, supra note 31, at 53-54.
'5' Id. at 55.
152 Id. at 49.
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The most noteworthy defense was, of course, the Federalist Papers, and AWRM
rightly gives these extensive treatment, albeit one with emphasis on a civic right under-
standing. Hamilton, in Federalist 29, indeed criticizes reliance upon the general
militia which, he contends, could never be sufficiently trained.'53 "Little more can
reasonably be aimed at with respect to the people at large than to have them properly
armed and equipped .... , 154 How much insight this gives us into the right to arms
is doubtful. Hamilton's purpose was to demonstrate that a standing army was nec-
essary and the militia insufficient, rather than to flesh out a right to arms or to laud
the militia.
The same cannot be said of James Madison's Federalist 46. Madison indeed
discusses the right to arms in a civic context, although a careful reading shows he
recognizes a distinction between civic in the sense of an organized militia and civic
in the sense of an armed populace. 5
5
Madison calculated that the new republic could not afford an army of more than
30,000 men, who would be counterbalanced by 500,000 militiamen. 156 He speaks in
terms of an organized, state-officered militia system.1 57 Then, however, he depicts the
underlying safeguard as involving widespread civilian armament, improved and made
more powerful by organization of a militia: "[blesides the advantage of being armed,
which the Americans possess over the people of almost every other nation, the exis-
tence of subordinate governments, to which the people are attached and by which the
militia officers are appointed, forms a barrier against the enterprises of ambition." 58
Madison later returns to the theme, pointing out that despite their armies European
monarchs "are afraid to trust the people with arms."' 59 It is clear that "the people with
arms" relates to widespread civilian arms ownership because Madison continues on
to suggest that in the American context the militia system and state governments make
this even more effective:
And it is not certain that with this aid alone they would not be
able to shake off their yokes. But were the people to possess the
additional advantages of local governments chosen by them-
selves ... and of officers appointed out of the militia by these
governments and attached both to them and to the militia, it may
be affirmed with the greatest assurance that the throne of every
tyranny in Europe would be speedily overturned in spite of the
legions which surround it.' 60
'13 THE FEDERALIST No. 29 (Alexander Hamilton).
154 Id. at 210 (Issac Kramnick ed., 1987).
... Id. No. 46, at 300-02 (James Madison).
156 Id. at 301.
157 Id.
'5' Id. (emphasis added).
159 Id.
'6o Id. at 301-02.
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Madison, in short, is describing a "civic purpose" but one with a dual basis:
tyranny might be prevented by an armed populace, but a militia organization will ren-
der the protection ironclad.' 6' A WRM mentions this duality but in the end assembles
it into a single concept: "[t]he existence of a well-armed population organized into
state militias guaranteed that American would never succumb to tyranny."'' 62
The Federalist Papers were not the only component of the written debates.
Noah Webster, the future lexicographer, had earlier contributed his Examination
into the Leading Principles of the Federal Constitution. AWRM fairly quotes the
relevant passage:
Before a standing army can rule, the people must be disarmed;
as they are in almost every kingdom of Europe. The supreme
power in America cannot enforce unjust laws by the sword;
because the whole body of the people are armed, and constitute
a force superior to any band of regular troops that can be, on any
pretence, raised in the United States.' 63
AWRM then, however, interprets this as militia-related: "[it was precisely because
the militia was such a central institution in American life that Americans had little
to fear from a standing army.""6 Webster, however, said nothing of the militia sys-
tem; his references are to the universal armament of the American population.
In short, throughout the ratification period, discussions of a right to arms took
the form either of (a) references to a purely individual right or its equivalent, a man-
date that Congress never disarm ordinary individuals or (b) references both to the
importance of individual arms ownership and importance of the militia. AWRM omits
most of the first and recasts the second into pure militia-centric references.
D. AWRM's Treatment of the Drafting and Congressional Passage of the
Bill of Rights
AWRM quotes Madison's proposal as introduced in the First Congress: "[tihe
right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed; a well armed, and
well regulated militia being the best security of a free country; but no person reli-
giously scrupulous of bearing arms, shall be compelled to render military service in
person."' 165 AWRM then notes that the First House reversed the order of the arms
161 id.
162 CORNELL, supra note 31, at 50.
163 CORNELL, supra note 31, at 47 (quoting Webster but leaving out the last twenty-two
words); WEBSTER, supra note 60, at 43.
"6 CORNELL, supra note 31, at 47.
165 Id. at 60.
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and Militia Clauses."6 This, AWRM contends, "had enormous constitutional signifi-
cance," 167 since the Militia Clause was now a preface to the right to arms, and hence
the right to arms must be construed in light of it.'
16
One might equally well make the opposite argument: the right to arms was now
the substantive guarantee and recognition of the militia merely an explanatory preface.
A better understanding-given that the First House trimmed out Madison's other pref-
atory clauses 169 -is that, as in the First Amendment, each clause had independent
significance. If the Virginians, Madison, or the First Congress were concerned only
about the militia, they would have stopped with "[a] well regulated militia [is] nec-
essary to the security of a free state."
Of the actual proceedings in the First Congress, we have sparse records. There
are reports of the House debates, but these were compiled, decades later, from news-
paper reports of the proceedings. 7 ° The First Senate met in executive session but kept
a journal of motions and votes.17' AWRM correctly notes that reports of the House
debates deal largely with Elbridge Gerry's concerns about the militia and consci-
entious objection, which seem to have been laughed off by the remainder of the
House.'72 We do have Madison's notes for his speech introducing the proposal,
which suggests that he saw it as paralleling the English Declaration of Rights and its
individual guarantee-the notes, in a section devoted to the inadequacies of the 1689
Declaration show "arms to Protts.," presumably meaning that it was inadequate be-
cause it guaranteed only Protestant subjects the right to arms. 73 AWRM makes no
mention of Madison's notes.
In the First Senate, the Journal does show a significant legislative decision. A
motion was made to add "for the common defence" to the right to arms and voted
down. 74 AWRM makes much of the Massachusetts decision to include this lan-




169 Freedom of the press lost his explanation that it was "one of the great bulwarks of
liberty," and the future Ninth Amendment lost the explanation that the express guarantees had
been inserted "either as actual limitations of such powers, or as inserted merely for greater
caution." 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 451-52 (Joseph Gales & William Seaton eds., 1789). Prefatory
and explanatory clauses were frequently used in bill of rights of the period. See Eugene Volokh,
The Commonplace Second Amendment, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 793-94 (1998).
170 2 ScHwARTz, supra note 68, at 984.
171 Hardy, supra note 2, at 611 n.253.
172 CORNELL, supra note 31, at 61. Gerry's concern that the provision for conscientious
objectors might lead to citizens avoiding militia duty was met with the rejoinder that "Mr.
Jackson did not expect that the people of the United States would turn Quaker or Moravian."
1 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 169, at 779.
17 See Hardy, supra note 2, at 608.
174 SENATE JOURNAL, supra note 64, at 77.
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constitutional principle emerged, linking the right to keep arms with the obligation
to bear them for the common defense."' 75 The Senate's rejection of the same proposal
would, by AWRM's logic, suggest that the First Congress meant to ensure that the
two were not linked.
A WRM attempts to explain away the Senate vote, but the explanation approaches
the incomprehensible: if inserted into the amendment, it "might have provided un-
scrupulous leaders with a pretext for prohibiting the militia from defending the states
or localities from internal or external threats."'76 AWRM makes no attempt to demon-
strate that anyone, then or at anytime prior to the publication of A WRM, saw the lan-
guage as posing that threat. The insertion of identical text in the Massachusetts Bill
of Rights had engendered controversy-but not on this theme, rather on the belief
that it might give the government the power to control private arms. 177 Once again,
a very large shoehorn is used to make individual rights evidence fit the civic rights
only constraint.'78
Finally, we have the one contemporary explanation of the meaning of the
Second Amendment, an explanation available both to Madison and to the First
Congress, and for which Madison thanked the author.'79 Federalist writer Tench
Coxe, a friend of Madison, published in the Federal Gazette and Philadelphia Evening
Post a clause-by-clause explanation of Madison's draft. 0 He treated the right to arms
as an individual right: since governments and armies might be tempted to abuse
power, "the people are confirmed by the next article in their right to keep and bear
their private arms.''
Coxe's article is difficult to reconcile with AWRM's approach, so the book at-
tempts to minimize it. It was "slapdash,"' 2 citing Coxe's self-deprecating remark
that he had dashed it off and not referencing his comment that "I have given them
175 CORNELL, supra note 31, at 24.
176 Id. at 62. After much reflection, I believe the argument being made is that "common
defense" might be read to be common to the entire United States. If so, the question is why
no such objection was raised to the Massachusetts Declaration and, indeed, why no contem-
porary-indeed, no one prior to the publication of A WRM-made such an objection to "for
the common defence" language in any constitution.
177 HALBROOK, supra note 22, at 64-65.
178 In yet another paradox, A WRM cites a proposal the Senate rejected-a ban on standing
armies in time of peace-as proof that the Senate was focused upon protecting the militia
system. CORNELL, supra note 31, at 51.
179 HALBROOK, supra note 22, at 76-77.
180 id.
181 Id. at 76 (emphasis added).
182 CORNELL, supra note 31, at 63. Coxe had earlier written an answer to the Pennsylvania
Minority, in which he praised the militia system. A WRM treats this earlier writing as authori-
tative and proof that Coxe did not think arms use for individual purposes was a serious issue.
Id. at 52-53, 63. When Coxe speaks of arms bearing for the militia, he is treated as an authority;
when he speaks of arms bearing for self-defense he is marginalized.
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a very careful perusal."'' 13 It was "not widely reprinted."' 84 That Madison wrote
back to say "I find [it] in the Gazettes here,"'8 5 i.e., in New York, where the First
Congress was meeting, should settle the sufficiency of its impact, even without Stephen
Halbrook's discovery that it was also reprinted in Boston. 186 It "prompted no com-
mentary by contemporaries," proving it was insignificant--or that it was taken as
indisputable. 87 Coxe deserves better. His article has a unique relevance to original
understanding: it analyzed the Bill of Rights clause-by-clause, is known to have been
reprinted in the three of the four largest American cities, and has Madison himself
attesting that it was well-known to the First Congress. It is hard to see why AWRM
seeks to dismiss his work.
HI. AWRM's COVERAGE OF POST-RATIFICATION TREATMENT
OF THE RIGHT TO ARMS
Early American thought on the right to arms comes largely from two sources:
legal commentaries and caselaw. Most of these sources indicate that the right to
arms was viewed as an individual right for individual purposes or as an individual
right both supporting the militia institution and also for individual purposes such as
self defense. AWRM here downplays the majority view or revises it in rather
dubious fashion.
A. Early American Legal Commentators
In the period after the framing, several prominent legal scholars published texts
that were authoritative in their time and which discuss the Second Amendment at
varying lengths. AWRM tends to emphasize those which placed emphasis on the
militia, or organized resistance as a deterrent to tyranny, and to omit or play down
those which emphasized individual self-defense. We will take these treatises in
chronological order.
183 Letter from Tench Coxe to James Madison (June 18, 1789), in 12 PAPERS OF JAMES
MADISON, supra note 1, at 239.
'8 CORNELL, supra note 31, at 63.
185 Letter from James Madison to Tench Coxe (June 24, 1789), in 12 PAPERS OF JAMES
MADISON, supra note 1, at 257.
186 HALBROOK, supra note 22, at 223 n. 152. No one has, to my knowledge, undertaken a
study of the article's coverage in all early newspapers, but its having made the press in Boston,
New York, and Philadelphia is certainly suggestive that it was widely covered. It appears to
have been the only section-by-section analysis of the Bill of Rights printed in the contem-
porary press.
187 CORNELL, supra note 31, at 63.
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1. St. George Tucker's Blackstone.
St. George Tucker was a law professor at the College of William and Mary,
later appointed to the Virginia Supreme Court by Thomas Jefferson and to its federal
district bench by James Madison.'88 His brother served in the First Senate, and his
closest friend served in the First House.
89
In 1803, he published the first American edition of Blackstone's Commentaries,"9
which remained for a quarter of a century the treatise most frequently cited by the
United States Supreme Court.' 9'
Tucker's Blackstone poses quite a problem for a "civic rights only" theory of the
Second Amendment, which Tucker lists as the Fourth Amendment. 92 Tucker cites
Blackstone's listing of the fifth auxiliary right, "of having arms for their defence suit-
able to their condition and degree, and such as are allowed by law," and drops a foot-
note on the American equivalent: 'The right of the people to keep and bear arms shall
not be infringed. Amendments to C.U.S. Art. 4, and this without any qualification
as to their condition or degree, as is the case in the British government."' 93 This
plainly tied the Second Amendment to the English right to arms, which was seen as
linked to self-defense rather than to militia functions and stresses that the American
right is broader than the English one. 194 Then, in his appendix on American law,
Tucker elaborates:
The right of self defence is the first law of nature: in most
governments it has been the study of rulers to confine this right
within the narrowest limits possible. Wherever standing armies
are kept up, and the right of the people to keep and bear arms is,
under any colour or pretext whatsoever, prohibited, liberty, if not
already annihilated, is on the brink of destruction. In England,
the people have been disarmed, generally, under the specious pre-
text of preserving the game: a never failing lure to bring over the
landed aristocracy to support any measure .... True it is, their
bill of rights seems at first view to counteract this policy: but the
right of bearing arms is confined to protestants, and the words
188 Hardy, supra note 2, at 611; Kopel, supra note 10, at 1371.
189 Hardy, supra note 2, at 612.
'90 ST. GEORGE TUCKER, BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES: WITH NOTES OF REFERENCE TO
THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES AND
OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA (Lawbook Exch. 1996) (1803).
'9' W. HAMILTON BRYSON, LEGAL EDUCATION IN VIRGINIA 1779-1979, at 682 (1982).
'92 The First Congress had passed twelve, not ten, amendments to the states, which failed
to ratify the first two. It was common in the early Republic to number the amendments as they
were passed by Congress, with what we today know as the Second Amendment being treated
as the fourth. In 1803, it was still possible that the first two might yet be ratified.
193 1 TUCKER, supra note 190, at 145 & n.40.
"9 See supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text.
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suitable to their condition and degree, have been interpreted to
authorise the prohibition of keeping a gun or other engine for the
destruction of game, to any farmer, or inferior tradesman, or other
person not qualified to kill game. 95
Tucker's footnote suggests an "individual right for individual purposes" view,
and his appendix suggests an "individual right both for individual and for civic pur-
poses" approach, with the former predominating; the latter also makes clear that,
whatever the source of the right, Tucker repudiates laws that prohibit some citizens
from "keeping" guns.
A decade ago, David Kopel noted that "none of the anti-individual [rights] writers
even admit Tucker's existence, let alone attempt to address the meaning of the most
important law book of the Early Republic.' 96 How AWRM rises to the challenge
is thus of exceptional interest.
A WRM's treatment of Tucker is peculiar, to say the least. AWRM begins by ac-
knowledging Tucker's importance and citing his unpublished lecture notes, which-
unlike his Blackstone-often mention the militia. 97 Nearly thirty pages later, it
returns to Tucker in a section entitled "An American Blackstone Ponders the Second
Amendment."' 98 Here it refers to his Blackstone, acknowledging that "Tucker dealt
with the Second Amendment in several places in his monumental treatise."' 99 AWRM
informs us that these included a "denunciation of Federalist use of volunteer militias,"
an interpretation of the Second Amendment as "a strong affirmation of states' rights,"
an argument for judicial enforcement of the Second Amendment, and a relation of
his "fears about potential federal disarmament of the militia."'2°
The treatment was a bit astonishing; as noted above, Tucker's Blackstone deals
with an individual right rising out of the right of self-defense. AWRM had not a
word on this. A glance at the endnotes showed that the citations are from Tucker's
A View of the Constitution,"0 a set of essays that were appended as a supplement
to his great treatise.2 2 An examination of A View of the Constitution uncovered sev-
eral serious deficiencies in AWRM's treatment of that work.
195 1 TUCKER, supra note 190, app. at 300. Tucker was incorrect as to the prohibition on
arms ownership by those not entitled to hunt. This had been repealed in the wake of the
Declaration of Rights. MALCOLM, supra note 22, at 126-27. The error is understandable:
even English jurists of the time complained that the hunting statutes were incomprehensible.
Hardy, supra note 2, at 613 n.263.
196 Kopel, supra note 10, at 1378.
197 CORNELL, supra note 31, at 73-74, 234 nn.1-2.
198 Id. at 102.
199 Id.
200 Id. at 102-03.
201 See id. at 240 nn.50-52.
202 ST. GEORGE TUCKER, A VIEw OF THE CONSTUTION OF THE UNTED STATES WITH
SELECTED WRnINGS (1803).
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First, Tucker is here attempting a survey of both the Constitution and the Bill of
Rights. The militia references cited by A WRM come in Tucker's discussion of the
Constitution's Militia Clause.2 °3 It is hardly surprising that in discussing the Militia
Clause, Tucker discusses the militia.
Second, in his A View of the Constitution, Tucker does have a section on the
Second Amendment. Here, Tucker repeats the individualistic treatment given the
right in his Blackstone Commentaries, and adds that the right is the very palladium
of liberty.204 AWRM entirely omits this, the most relevant, passage.
Third, A WRM cites Tucker as allowing for judicial enforcement of the right, as a
challenge to "the Federalist theory of loose construction of the Constitution., 211 This
is correct, but Tucker's words clearly tie in an individual view of the right to arms:
[i]f, for example, a law be passed by congress, prohibiting the
free exercise of religion, according to the dictates, or persuasions
of a man's own conscience; or abridging the freedom of speech,
or of the press; or the right of the people to assemble peaceably,
or to keep and bear arms; it would, in any of these cases, be the
province of the judiciary to pronounce whether any such act were
constitutional, or not; and if not, to acquit the accused from any
penalty which might be annexed to the breach of such unconsti-
tutional act.
2 6
A WRM's conversion of the clearly individualist Tucker into a militia-focused com-
mentator requires omitting everything he said about the Second Amendment and
substituting what he said about Article I's Militia Clauses. This is sleight of hand,
not a fair reading of authority.
2. William Rawle's A View of the Constitution
In 1825, William Rawle published his A View of the Constitution.207 Like Tucker,
Rawle would have had an exceptional insight into the original understanding of the
Bill of Rights since he sat in the Pennsylvania legislature when it ratified the amend-
ments.20 8 His book was widely used as a constitutional law teaching tool in early
American law schools. 2°
203 CORNELL, supra note 31, at 214-16; TUCKER, supra note 202.
204 TUCKER, supra note 202, at 238-39 (repeating the text from the Appendix in his
BLACKSTONE COMMENTARIES).
205 CORNELL, supra note 31, at 103.
206 TUCKER, supra note 202, at 293.
207 WILAMi RAWLE, A VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
(2d ed. 1829) (1825).
208 ELIZABETH KELLEY BAUER, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION 1790-1860, at 61
(Lawbook Exch. 1999).
209 DAVID BROWN, EULOGIUM UPON WILLIAM RAWLE 38 (1837).
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Also like Tucker, Rawle poses a major barrier to a "civic rights only" approach.
His text made clear that he saw the militia portion and the right to arms portion of
the Second Amendment as independent legal mandates.2'0 He first discussed the im-
portance of the militia, while conceding that regular troops were often more valuable,
and then he treated the individual right to arms as a separate, related restriction on
governmental power:
The corollary, from the first position, is, that the right of the
people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed.
The prohibition is general. No clause in the Constitution
could by any rule of construction be conceived to give to congress
a power to disarm the people. Such a flagitious attempt could
only be made under some general pretence by a state legislature.
But if in any blind pursuit of inordinate power, either should
attempt it, this amendment may be appealed to as a restraint on
both."1I
It is simply impossible to make Rawle fit a "civic rights only" box, unless it is
one very large container. AWRM simply omits any mention of Rawle's work.1 2 It
is hard to justify the omission. Rawle was not only a respected constitutional author-
ity, he was the only early commentator who actually voted to ratify the Bill of Rights.
3. Justice Story's Commentaries on the Constitution
In 1833, Justice Joseph Story published his Commentaries on the Constitution
of the United States.213 Story did discuss the right to arms in terms of organized re-
sistance to government oppression, informing his readers that tyrants seek their goals
"by disarming the people, and making it an offence to keep arms, and by substitut-
ing a regular army in the stead of a resort to the militia. 21 4 Story's discussion fits
210 RAWLE, supra note 207, at 125-26.
211 Id. The idea of appealing to a Federal Bill of Rights provision in a case brought under
state law may seem strange to our eyes. But in the natural rights theory that prevailed at that
time, written guarantees were memorials of a right, and a guarantee as against one government
could easily be seen at least as evidence that the right existed as to the other. In fact, the Second
Amendment was later invoked, by a state court, to strike down a state law. Nunn v. State, 1
Ga. 243 (1846).
212 Rawle himself, however, is mentioned as prosecuting attorney in the Whiskey Act
Rebellion cases. CORNELL, supra note 31, at 97.
213 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONsTrTUmON OF THE UNITED STATES
(Carolina Academic Press 1987) (1833) [hereinafter STORY, COMMENTARIES].
214 JOSEPH STORY, A FAMILIAR ExPOSITION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
264 (Lawbook Exch. 1999) (1865); see also STORY, COMMENTARIES, supra note 213, at
708-09.
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"civic rights," if not necessarily "militia-centric only. '215 Story is accordingly given
treatment in A WRM.
216
4. Thomas Cooley's General Principles of Constitutional Law
Thomas Cooley was the most renowned American legal authority of his age.217
Cooley became the first Dean of the University of Michigan Law School, and later sat
on the Michigan Supreme Court; Roscoe Pound named him as among the top ten
American judges of all time, and one scholar considers him "the most influential legal
author of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 21 8
His book, The General Principles of Constitutional Law 219 was released in 1880.
Cooley treated the Second Amendment as an individual right.22° Indeed, Cooley went
further and pointed out that if the right to arms were limited to militia-related arms
possession, then the guarantee would be meaningless. 22' The very government that
it was meant to check-and that could control the definition of the militia-would
be in a position to define its boundaries and negate any checks upon itself, defeating
the Framers' intent.222
It may be supposed from the phraseology of this provision that
the right to keep and bear arms was only guaranteed to the militia;
but this would be an interpretation not warranted by the intent.
The militia, as has been elsewhere explained, consists of those
persons who, under the law, are liable to the performance of mili-
tary duty, and are officered and enrolled for service when called
upon. But... if the right were limited to those enrolled, the pur-
pose of this guaranty might be defeated altogether by the action
or neglect to act of the government it was meant to hold in check.
The meaning of the provision undoubtedly is, that the people,
from whom the militia must be taken, shall have the right to keep
and bear arms, and they need no permission or regulation of law
for the purpose.223
215 Story does not make clear whether he regards criminalizing arms possession and sub-
stituting a standing army to be independent or dependent acts of tyranny.
216 CORNELL, supra note 31, at 151-52, 159.
217 Kopel, supra note 10, at 1461-62.
218 Id.
219 THOMAS M. COOLEY, THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CONsTITUTIONAL LAW IN THE
UNrrED STATES OF AMERICA (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1880).
220 Id. at 271.
221 Id.
222 Id.
223 THOMAS M. COOLEY, THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITrIONAL LAW IN THE
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This interpretation may or may not be consistent with a "civic purpose only"
understanding, depending upon how "civic purpose" is defined. If "civic purpose"
is seen as including "widespread civilian armament [that] will deter tyranny," Cooley
would fit the mold. If it is defined as "the right to bear arms existing only as linked
to the militia," Cooley's text is a sharp repudiation of the view: as he points out, if
that were the case, the very government which is to be deterred would have the power
to eliminate the deterrence. A WRM makes no mention of Cooley's work.
5. Benjamin Oliver's The Rights of an American Citizen
AWRM brings in another, and rather obscure,224 commentator. So far as can be
seen, Benjamin Oliver published some early texts on business law and business forms.
In 1832, he authored The Rights of an American Citizen: With a Commentary on
State Rights, and on the Constitution and Policy of the United States. 225
AWRM discusses Oliver's position that the militia portion of the amendment
was its true purpose, adding:
Indeed, Oliver declared that the original understanding of the right
to bear arms was "intended to apply to the right of the people to
bear arms for such purposes only." Oliver conceded that this orig-
inal understanding was slowly being challenged by the new view
that saw this right in more individualistic terms .... 226
Oliver does take, rather, a "collective rights" view, but his conclusions are more
tentative-he used the qualifier "probably"-than AWRM suggests.227 Moreover,
his concession that there was a rival interpretation gives no suggestion that it was
a newly evolved view:
The provision of the constitution, declaring the right of the people
to keep and bear arms, &c. was probably intended to apply to the
right of the people to bear arms for such purposes only, and not
to prevent congress or the legislatures of the different states from
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 298 (Andrew C. McLaughlin ed., Boston, Little, Brown & Co.,
3d ed. 1898).
224 AWRM describes Oliver's commentary as "influential," but it gives no citation or evi-
dence of this influence. CORNELL, supra note 31, at 152. The only other reference I can find
to him comes in Kopel, supra note 10, at 1399.
225 BENJAMIN L. OLIVER, THE RIGHTS OF AN AMERICAN CITIZEN: WITH A COMMENTARY
ON STATE RIGHTS, AND ON THE CONsTrIUION AND POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES (Books
for Libraries Press 1970) (1832).
226 CORNELL, supra note 31, at 152.
227 OLIVER, supra note 225, at 177.
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enacting laws to prevent the citizens from always going armed.
A different construction however has been given to it.
228
To be sure, if we are assessing original understanding, a contemporary non-
academic commentator is entitled to consideration. On the other hand, one might
wonder why AWRM includes the almost-unknown Oliver, while completely omit-
ting Rawle and Cooley.
AWRM also does not take account of other popular writers who departed from
a militia-related understanding. Chief among these would be Joel Barlow, Revolu-
tionary War veteran, who authored Advice to the Privileged Orders, in the Several
States of Europe.2 29 Barlow stood out as a renaissance man in a time when such men
were common: a clergyman and theologian, a popular poet, a successful diplomat,
and an American whose political writings were debated on the floor of Parliament.230
Barlow boasted of American laws "not only permitting every man to arm, but
obliging him to arm," which draws a line between the individual right and the militia
duty.231' He postulated the equality of men, and from this deduced, first, that they
must form "an equal representative government" and second, "[tihat the people will
be universally armed: they will assume those weapons for security, which the art of
war has invented for destruction. 232
In summary, A WRM' s treatment of early constitutional commentators falls far short
of expectations. Of the four legal giants, two are completely omitted, and a third' s opin-
ions are unfairly recast to leave out everything he said about the Second Amendment
and substitute for them his discussion of the Militia Clauses of Article I.
B. AWRM's Treatment of Early American Caselaw
There was fairly extensive treatment of the right to arms in early American
caselaw. Antebellum cases mostly focused upon bans on carrying concealed weapons
and later cases upon bans of weapons other than firearms, such as brass knuckles,
Bowie knives, and "Arkansas toothpicks," or small pistols. The results broke down
into four classes.
228 Id. Oliver gives no footnotes or other references.
229 JOEL BARLow, ADVICETO THE PRIVILEGED ORDERS, IN THE SEVERAL STATES OF EUROPE
RESULTING FROM THE NECESSrrY AND PROPRIETY OFAGENERALREVOLUTION IN THE PRINCIPLE
OF GOVERNMENT pt. 1 (New York, Childs & Swaine 1792).
230 See generally JAMES WOODRESS, A YANKEE'S ODYSSEY: THE LIFE OF JOEL BARLOW
(1958).
231 BARLOw, supra note 229, at 24.
232 Id. at 69-70. For an exceptionally thorough account of the lesser commentators of the
early nineteenth century, see Kopel, supra note 10, at 1397-408.
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(1) Arms restrictions-even concealed weapons bans-are un-
constitutional, since arms bearing is an individual right and
the legislature may not restrict any aspect of such a right.
Illustrative are Bliss v. Commonwealth233 and Nunn v. State.3
These clearly recognize an individual right to arms.
(2) Concealed weapons bans are constitutional as a manner of
time, place, and manner restriction since, while arms bearing
is an individual right, these laws restrict only one manner of
exercising it. Here we have State v. Chandler235 and State v.
Reid.23 6 These cases also recognize an individual right to arms.
(3) Bans on carrying, but not ownership of, non-military type
weapons are constitutional, since the term "bear arms" has a
military connotation and thus pertains to military-type arms.
Aymette v. State 237 is the exemplar here, with the Tennes-
see court noting that the state guarantee was of a right to
keep and bear arms for the common defense, in order for the
people, as a body, "to protect the public liberty, to keep in
awe those who are in power, and to maintain the supremacy
of the laws and the constitution."2 38 Thus the court concluded
that the right was applicable only to arms "usually employed
in civilized warfare., 239
In a followup case, Andrews v. State,24 ° the Tennessee
court refined the test, holding that keeping of arms was an
individual right, and only bearing of them was subject to limi-
tation, and then expansively reading "keep" to cover almost
all ordinary use.241 "Bearing arms for the common defense
233 12 Ky. (2 Litt.) 90 (1822) (striking a concealed weapons ban).
234 1 Ga. 243,251 (1846) (striking a handgun ban and noting that "[tihe right of the whole
people.... and not militia only, to keep and bear arms of every description, and not such
merely as are used by the militia, shall not be infringed").
235 5 La. Ann. 489, 490 (1850) ("It interfered with no man's right to carry arms (to use
its words) 'in full open view,' which places men upon an equality. This is the right guaranteed
by the Constitution of the United States .... ).
236 1 Ala. 612, 619 (1840) (upholding the ban on concealed carry but adding that "the
Legislature cannot inhibit the citizen from bearing arms openly, because it authorizes him to
bear them for the purposes of defending himself and the State, and it is only when carried
openly, that they can be efficiently used for defence").
237 21 Tenn. (2 Hum.) 154 (1840).
238 Id. at 158.
239 Id.
240 50 Tenn. (3 Heisk.) 165 (1871).
241 Id. at 178-79. See generally Glenn Harlan Reynolds, A Critical Guide to the Second
Amendment, 62 TENN. L. REv. 461, 500-04 (1995) (discussing Aymette and Andrews).
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may well be held to be a political right .... but the right to
keep them, with all that is implied fairly as an incident to this
right, is a private individual right, guaranteed to the citizen,
not the soldier.,
242
These cases recognize an individual right to keep arms
and an individual right to carry military-style arms.
(4) In contrast, a variation of the "civic rights" view was found
in State v. Buzzard,243 in which the three justices of the
Arkansas Supreme Court split three ways,2" with the lead
opinion taking the view that the ban was a reasonable regu-
lation and adding that the right to bear arms "for the[] com-
mon defense" meant only that the government might not
impose regulations that interfered with the ability to resist
tyranny, which a ban on concealed carry did not.245
Approaches (1) and (2) are inconsistent with a "civic right" understanding; both
treat the right to arms as a purely individual matter. Approach (3) is only marginally
consistent with "civic right," in the sense that the arms protected must be suitable for
militia use, although their owner need have no militia purpose at the time; it is what
I have entitled the hybrid individual right. Approach (4) is consistent with "civic
right," at least in a broad sense. A government may regulate weapons, so long as the
regulation does not resist the capacity of the people to resist tyranny.
AWRM is quite selective in discussing this caselaw. We will examine each of
the four classes and how they are treated in the text.
(1) Arms restrictions are unconstitutional: Bliss' and Nunn.247
A WRM mentions only Bliss,2' with most of the discussion cen-
tering upon the legislature's angry reaction to the decision.
(2) Concealed carry limits are constitutional-there is an indi-
vidual right to carry arms, but one mode of carrying may be
242 Andrews, 50 Tenn. (3 Heisk.)at 182.
243 4 Ark. 18 (1842).
244 The statute forbade bearing a pistol, knife, or sword cane concealed; the state consti-
tution guaranteed a right to arms "for the[] common defense." Id. at 27. Chief Justice Ringo
upheld the concealed weapons ban as a reasonable regulation of the right since it did not,
directly or indirectly, "impair or render inefficient the means provided by the Constitution for
the defense of the State." Id. Justice Dickinson, concurring, gave the first judicial endorsement
of a collective right view. Id. at 30-32 (Dickinson, J.). Justice Lacy, dissenting, rejected the
collective rights approach and the reasonable regulation claim. Id. at 35-37 (Lacy, J.).
245 Id. at 27.
246 Bliss v. Commonwealth, 12 Ky. (2 Litt.) 90 (1822).
247 Nunn v. State, 1 Ga. 243 (1846).
248 CORNELL, supra note 31, at 144-45.
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restricted: Chandler249 and Reid.250 A WRM does not mention
these cases.
(3) Carrying of arms may be restricted, so long as they are not
of military or militia type: Aymette251 and Andrews.252 Here,
AWRM discusses Aymette but not Andrews, which greatly
narrowed the scope of that ruling, nor does it discuss the fact
that the rule was limited to carrying, and not possessing, of
arms-"bearing" arms was seen as having military/civic ref-
erence but not "keeping" them.253
(4) Concealed weapons bans are constitutional because con-
cealed carry has nothing to do with the capability of resisting
tyranny: Buzzard.254 A WRM discusses the lead opinion?55
AWRM then informs us, without citation, that most courts of the period rejected
an individual view of the right to arms. 256 That would have come as news to the
Bliss, Nunn, Chandler, Reid, and Andrews courts. A standard that only pertained
in Arkansas-to the extent one opinion of a court split 1-1-1 can be considered a
standard-is treated as the majority state rule.
The most interesting, authoritative, and appalling decision from this period re-
lating to the right to arms is relegated to an endnote in AWRM, for no apparent reason
other than that it would sinkAWRM's desired conclusion. Scott v. Sanford257 deserves
a fuller consideration. In Dred Scott, the United States Supreme Court held that (1)
the Missouri Compromise was unconstitutional, since slaves were property and might
be taken anywhere and (2) the Court lacked jurisdiction, since free blacks were not
citizens and hence there was no diversity of citizenship. 58
In the course of arguing the lack of jurisdiction, Chief Justice Taney noted that
many states had slave codes regulating conduct of free blacks, and he reasoned that
many of the states that ratified the Constitution would not have done so if they had
thought free blacks would, under it, acquire the rights of citizens. 259 Then he listed
those rights:
249 State v. Chandler, 5 La. Ann. 489 (1850).
250 State v. Reid, 1 Ala. 612 (1840).
251 Aymette v. State, 21 Tenn. (2 Hum.) 154 (1840).
252 Andrews v. State, 50 Tenn. (3 Heisk.) 165 (1871).
253 CORNELL, supra note 31, at 146.
5 State v. Buzzard, 4 Ark. 18 (1842).
255 CORNELL, supra note 31, at 147.
256 Id. at 146.
157 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
258 Id.
259 Id. at 416.
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For if [free Blacks] were so received, and entitled to the privileges
and immunities of citizens, it would exempt them from the oper-
ation of the special laws and from the police regulations which
[the states] considered to be necessary for their own safety. It
would give to persons of the negro race, who were recognised as
citizens in any one State of the Union, the right to enter every other
State whenever they pleased.... and it would give them the full
liberty of speech in public and in private upon all subjects upon
which its own citizens might speak; to hold public meetings upon
political affairs, and to keep and carry arms wherever they went.26
The equating of keeping and carrying arms "wherever they went" with the right
to bear arms is flatly impossible to reconcile with a "civic rights only" viewpoint.
AWRM's endnote discussion 261' argues the statement was dicta-it is an alternate
holding, and as one going to subject-matterjurisdiction, perhaps entitled to a certain
primacy-and that in referring to "keep and carry" Taney could not have meant the
Second Amendment, which refers to "keep and bear" arms.
AWRM does have a point here. The problem is that this point destroys its thesis.
It must be understood that the Court at this point is not summarizing federal Bill of
Rights guarantees. It is arguing that under Article IV, section 2,262 if free blacks were
citizens then when they traveled to a slave state, the state would have to accord them
the rights of its own citizens, including the right to arms. Thus Taney uses "keep and
carry arms" as a summary of right to bear arms provisions and not just as a specific
descriptor of the Second Amendment.
The opinion thus inflicts serious damage on A WRM's thesis. It indicates that
the Court viewed all right-to-arms clauses of the time as covering individual carry,
for individual purposes, anywhere-"to keep and carry arms wherever they went,"
263
in the words of the Court.
AWRM does discuss the Supreme Court's ruling in Houston v. Moore,2 apre-
emption decision relating to a militia courtmartial. A delinquent Pennsylvania militia-
man had been fined by a state militia court-martial, acting pursuant to a state law that
incorporated federal militia statutes. 265 The defendant argued that congressional
militia enactments pre-empted the field.266
260 Id. at 416-17.
261 CORNELL, supra note 3 1, at 247-48 n.24.
262 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2 (requiring a state to accord citizens of other states all privileges
and immunities accorded its own citizens).
263 Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 417.
264 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 1 (1820).
265 Id. at 2-3.
266 Id. at 3-4.
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The majority opinion marked the first appearance of "conflict pre-emption" in
Supreme Court caselaw, with the majority holding that the state law was permissible
since it conflicted with no federal enactment.267 Justice Story dissented, essentially
arguing that Congress had entirely occupied the field of militia regulation, leaving the
states without even the power to enforce federal laws on the subject.2 68 Story then
quoted the Second Amendment with the diffident remark that it "may not, perhaps,
be thought to have any important bearing on this point," but that if it did, it confirmed
his analysis.269
What is most remarkable about Houston is what the Court did not say. The key
issue was what power states retained over the militia, with the majority allowing they
had merely the power to enforce federal laws, and the dissent denying even that. Yet
the majority entirely passed over the Second Amendment, and even Justice Story's
dissent felt it was of doubtful relevance. If American jurists of 1820 had any con-
ception that the Second Amendment restricted the federal militia powers, one might
have expected it to be at the core of the decision.
AWRM treats Story's dissent as a "reiteration of the civic conception of the
Second Amendment, a right of citizens to keep and bear arms in a well-regulated
militia. 2 70 But it is hardly surprising that a case arising out of a militia court-
martial should give rise to language about the militia. It is hard to see how a "right"
of any type, civic or otherwise, was involved in the case. The militiaman was not
exercising a right: he was being prosecuted for failing to carry out his duties!
C. A Summary of AWRM's Treatment of the Second Amendment
An examination of the entire historical record suggests that Americans held
differing views of the purpose of the right to arms. Some indeed spoke of it as a
political/civic matter, tied to the militia system. Others saw it as an individual/civic
matter, with private arms ownership deterring tyranny. Others viewed it as serving
an individual need, an ancillary to a fundamental right of self-defense. Quite a few
viewed it as serving multiple purposes. A full understanding of all purposes is nec-
essary since the First Congress had to placate citizens concerned with each, which
is the obvious explanation of why the Second Amendment does not stop with "being
necessary to the security of a free State." '271
267 Id. at 29-32. The authoritative treatment of Houston and other militia pre-emption cases
is J. Norman Heath, Exposing the Second Amendment: Federal Preemption of State Militia
Legislation, 79 U. DET. MERCY L. REv. 39 (2001).
268 Houston, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) at 53 (Story, J., dissenting).
269 Id. at 52-53.
270 CORNELL, supra note 31, at 135.
271 U.S. CONST. amend. II.
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Abolitionist writers did, as AWRM notes, make prominent use of an individual
right for individual purposes.2 72 But they were not inventing the argument. They were
building upon a framework dating back to 1688 and to Blackstone, if not further,27 3
which had been well developed before abolitionism became an issue.
AWRM's treatment of the framing period can fairly be called one-sided; it empha-
sizes references to the militia, while references to a purely individual right are either
omitted or reinterpreted in ways that do great violence to their meaning. Its treat-
ment of the right to arms in the Early Republic suffers from more serious flaws, to
the point of being completely unreliable. Of the four great commentators of the
period, it entirely omits two, and it completely mischaracterizes a third.274 It omits
the majority of early caselaw on the right to arms, and it creates the impression
that a minority view-actually that of only one judge on one court-was the near-
universal understanding.275
One would not know from reading A WRM that the "individual right for individual
purposes" position was taken by three of the four early constitutional commentators,
by a great majority of state courts, and by the United States Supreme Court. The text
manages to inflate what was a minority position into an illusory majority status by
omitting or recasting all the contrary evidence.
III. AWRM's TREATMENT OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
The question of whether the Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges and Immunities
Clause was intended to incorporate the federal Bill of Rights, inter alia, has been
extensively explored by Akhil Amar276 and Michael Kent Curtis;27 7 whether it was
meant to incorporate the Second Amendment has been explored by Stephen Halbrook,27 8
Robert Cottrol, and Ray Diamond.279 All these commentators have pointed to frequent
references in Congress-in particular, by the amendment's sponsors, Senator Jacob
Howard and Representative John A. Bingham-to the former Confederate states'
Black Codes, which forbade arms ownership by black citizens, and to how these
(1) violated the rights of individuals to keep and bear arms or (2) would be ruled out
by the proposed Fourteenth Amendment.
272 CORNELL, supra note 31, at 152-55.
273 See David B. Kopel, The Catholic SecondAmendment, 29 HAMLINE L. REv. 520 (2006);
David B. Kopel, The Religious Roots of the American Revolution and the Right to Keep and
Bear Arms, 17 J. FIREARMS & PUB. POL'Y 167 (2005).
274 See supra notes 188-232 and accompanying text.
275 See supra notes 233-70 and accompanying text.
276 AMAR, supra note 25, at 137, 215-30.
277 MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, No STATE SHALL ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1986). For a dissenting view, see RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT
BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1977).
278 HALBROOK, supra note 22, at 170-78.
279 Cottrol & Diamond, The Second Amendment, supra note 22.
1276
BOOK REVIEW: A WELL REGULATED MILITIA
AWRM contends that the notion of an individual right to arms for individual self-
defense arose from antebellum abolitionist thought,28° and it accepts that the sponsors
of the Fourteenth Amendment were prominent abolitionists. 28 Even if one were
skeptical of a purely individual right based on the Second Amendment, one might
expect A WRM to find such a right in the Fourteenth Amendment.
A WRM instead begins by noting that some legislators spoke of the Fourteenth
Amendment as promoting equality rather than in terms of incorporating the Bill of
Rights.282 Because the amendment also contains the Equal Protection of the Law
Clause,283 the fact that some supporters stressed equality while others stressed incor-
poration is not dispositive.
A WRM then adds that "sorting out what the state legislatures and the vast majority
of Americans thought about the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment is more dif-
ficult" and invokes stump speeches from the 1866 election, which it contends stressed
considerations of equality. 284 As noted above, a stress upon the Equal Protection
Clause hardly disproves an intent to incorporate under the Privileges and Immunities
Clause. Moreover, Professor Curtis's research found extensive references to the
Fourteenth Amendment as intended to incorporate the Bill of Rights in contempo-
rary newspapers, speeches, and most vitally, in the state legislative debates on ratifi-
cation.285 These are of far greater weight in determining constitutional purpose than
are electoral speeches.
AWRM treats at length the appalling decision of United States v. Cruikshank,286
which dismissed a prosecution for having broken up a meeting of blacks, disarming
them, and then killing over a hundred of them.287 The Court held that none of these
activities were barred by the Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges and Immunities
Clause or by its enforcing legislation, since rights to peaceable assembly, to arms, and
to life were not "privileges and immunities" of United States citizenship.288 AWRM
believes that it finds in the decision the beginning of the "collective right" view
because the Court said that the right of "bearing arms for lawful purposes" was not
a right created by the Second Amendment. 289 From this, AWRM deduces that the
280 CORNEL., supra note 31, at 152-53. As demonstrated supra in note 273 and accompa-
nying text, the abolitionists were not actually inventing an individual right for individual
purposes; they were building upon a widely accepted approach that dated back to English law.
281 CORNELL, supra note 31, at 172-73.
282 Id. at 174.
283 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
284 CORNELL, supra note 31, at 173-74.
285 CURTIS, supra note 277, at 131-53.
286 92 U.S. 542 (1876). ForA WRM's discussion of the case, see CORNELL, supra note 31,
at 190-97.
287 Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 559.
288 Id. at 557-59.
289 Id. at 553; CORNELL, supra note 31, at 195, 198-99.
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opinion held that "[t]he purpose of the amendment was to guard the state militias
against the danger of federal disarmament. '290
This is a misunderstanding of Cruikshank-but then, Cruikshank is an easily
misunderstood opinion. The ruling must be read against the background of The
Slaughter-House Cases,291 whose reasoning was essentially: (1) the Fourteenth
Amendment refers to privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States, (2) it
must thus be read-very restrictively-to cover only rights that were created by the
U.S. Constitution, and (3) it thus does not cover preexisting "natural" rights that the
Constitution or Bill of Rights guaranteed but did not create.292 Thus the Cruikshank
Court wrote off the right to assemble because "[t]he right was not created by the
[First A]mendment. ''293 It did the same for the Second Amendment, noting that arms
bearing for lawful purposes "is not a right granted by the Constitution. Neither is it
in any manner dependent upon that instrument for its existence. '"294
Cruikshank, in short, had nothing to do with a collective right approach. If any-
thing, it suggests that the Court viewed individual arms bearing as a natural right,
albeit one therefore not enforceable under the Fourteenth Amendment!
A WRM's treatment of the Fourteenth Amendment thus tracks its treatment of
the Second Amendment. In each case, the fact that certain Framers on certain occa-
sions spoke of one aspect of a right is regarded as evidence that they, and others,
had no additional understanding of it and its purpose.
IV. LOGICAL CONSEQUENCES OF A CIVIC RIGHT ONLY APPROACH
AWRM is a historical work, and as such it need not consider the further legal
question: assuming arguendo that a "civic right only" theory were proven, in the
sense that the relevant historical record referred only to a civic militia-centric con-
ception of the right, leaving other purposes to silence, what effect would this have
on interpretation of the right to arms?
A. Interpretative Methodology
As Professor Levinson has observed, the Second Amendment at times seems to
exist in some manner of interpretative alternate universe, in which those who defend
an expansive reading of the First, Fourth, Fifth, and other amendments tend to prefer
the narrowest possible reading of the Second, and vice versa.295 It thus may be inter-
esting to visit other attempts to narrow rights in light of what were alleged to be their
expressed purposes.
29 CORNELL, supra note 31, at 195.
291 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
292 Id.
293 Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 552.
294 Id. at 553.
295 Levinson, supra note 24, at 638-39, 645.
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Edwin Meese, Attorney General under the Reagan administration, made such
an effort by arguing that First Amendment freedom from establishment arose in the
context of preventing one church from achieving legal supremacy over others, and
hence the amendment should not prevent governmental preferences to all churches
as a group.296 For this, he was taken to task by Professor Levy.297
A more condign fate befell Judge Robert Bork after he argued that "[c]onstitu-
tional protection should be accorded only to speech that is explicitly political. There
is no basis forjudicial intervention to protect any other form of expression, be it scien-
tific, literary or that variety of expression we call obscene or pornographic. 298
AWRM's application illustrates the different forms of originalism. Original-
ism began as "original intent"-what did the Framers intend?299 It has evolved into
"original understanding"-what did Americans understand they were ratifying?3°°
Professor Balkin has distinguished a third form of originalism, which he terms "orig-
inal application"-would the Framers or their contemporaries have upheld or stricken
the law in question-and which he feels should not bind the modem interpreter.3"'
AWRM tends toward a different and quite restrictive form, which we might
entitle "original problem resolution"-a right should be construed as extending only
to cover those specific problems that the Framers experienced or foresaw.
The problem with this approach is that it would narrowly define our rights in
terms of the problems which Americans felt were worthy of commentary in 1787-1791.
Most of these indeed dealt with the risks of political tyranny: Americans of the time
felt that they had just escaped one tyrant and feared they might be creating another.0 2
The proposed Constitution gave Congress power to regulate the militia. It was thus
296 LEONARD W. LEVY, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE: RELIGION AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT 92 (1986).
297 Id. passim.
298 Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some FirstAmendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J.
1, 20 (1971).
299 See Philip C. Kissau, Triangulating Constitutional Theory: Power, Time, and Everyman,
53 BUFF. L. REv. 269, 301-02 (2005).
300 See RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF
LIBERTY (2004); Randy E. Barnett,An OriginalismforNonoriginalists, 45 LoY. L. REv. 611
(1999); Ilya Somin, "Active Liberty" and Judicial Power: What Should Courts Do to Promote
Democracy?, 100 Nw. U. L. REV. 1827 (2006) (reviewing STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY:
INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION (2005)). Professor Levinson, who is not an
originalist, has come up with a striking example of the difference. The decision of the Fourth
Congress to enact the Alien and Sedition Acts could be taken as proof of an original intent to
allow punishment of the press under certain circumstances, but the resulting demolition of
the Federalist Party by American voters is suggestive that their understanding differed from
this intent.
'0' See Posting of Jack M. Balkin to Balkinization, http://balkin.blogspot.com/2005/06/
original-meaning-and-original.html (June 23, 2005, 16:06 EST).
302 See THE FEDERALIST Nos. 48, 51 (James Madison).
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only natural that Anti-Federalist critics would frequently invoke the right to arms
in a militia context. We cannot know what a given Framer thought but only what
he wrote, and political advocacy is driven by problems of the day rather than broad
principles.
Indeed, it would not be difficult to use this approach as did Attorney General
Meese or Judge Bork, to narrow the First Amendment beyond what its text or spirit
permits. Any interpretative methodology that can be used to constrain the Second
Amendment can as easily be employed to constrain the First. A brief effort, based
on Professor Curtis's excellent history,30 3 follows:
(1) Freedom of expression, like the right to arms, comes into
American thought via the English Whig movement, 3° al-
though it lacks the common law underpinnings of the right
to arms. In fact, throughout the common law period, dissent
was largely equated to treason, and until 1694, publishers of
books on politics or religion had to obtain a license for each
work.3
05
(2) Most framing-era discussions of freedom of speech and press
related to protection of political speech and the risk of a re-
turn of press licensing for political tracts. 306 The dominant
First Amendment concern over that period was whether the
new government would suppress political expression as a
means of achieving tyranny.30 7
(3) Therefore, if we applyAWRM' s methodology here, freedom
of expression should extend no further than protection of
political speech, and perhaps even there only so far as pre-
vention of prior restraint. Indeed, here we have further evi-
dence in the form of the 1798 Sedition Act, in which an early
Congress criminalized criticism of itself or the President and
which early courts upheld as involving neither press licensing
308nor prior restraint.
303 ICHAELKENT CURTIS, FREE SPEECH: 'THE PEOPLE'S DARLING PRIVILEGE": STRUGGLES
FOR FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN AMERICAN HISTORY (2000).
304 Id. at 36-40.
305 Id. at 29, 44.
306 See, e.g., THE ORIGIN OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE
BILL OF RIGHTS 34, 52, 58, 86 (David E. Young ed., 2d ed. 1995).
7 CURTIS, supra note 303, at 433-36.
308 Id. at 4, 77-78. The courts' view was that there might be freedom of speech but not
necessarily freedom after speech. Id. We might make an interesting comparison to the Militia
Act of 1792, ch. 33, 1 Stat. 271, in which Congress commanded all able-bodied adult white
males to own firearms and ammunition.
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The actual outcome illustrates the error of this approach. While framing-period
Americans had spoken of freedom of expression largely in a political and prior-
restraint context, when the right was challenged by the Sedition Act, they spoke
more broadly-and acted more broadly---essentially destroying the Federalist Party.3'
From about 1800 onward, the unconstitutionality of measures such as the Sedition
Act became universally accepted."' It was not that Americans had changed their
mind: it was that they had had less reason to record and express the full breadth of
their feelings on the matter in 1787-1789. And, perhaps, they had thought "Congress
shall make no law"31' was both sufficient and unambiguous.
B. Policy Implications
A WRM's main policy impact comes in its argument that a "civic purpose only"
individual right would be consistent with a wide variety of firearm regulations.
It points out that the colonies and early states had a variety of regulations, al-
though these were largely aimed at limited time, place, and manner restrictions-
carrying concealed weapons--or aimed at individuals seen as dangerous or outside
the political vale-Indians, slaves, those in Pennsylvania who refused to swear an oath
of allegiance during the Revolution." 2 The latter can hardly be invoked to demon-
strate an understanding of the scope of rights; the same Pennsylvania authorities who
disarmed those who refused to sign an oath also arrested them without probable cause,
searched their residences under general warrants, and seized their political papers.313
What is done to wartime outsiders-and those refusing the oath who were seen as
enemies in an "us or them" situation3 14-rarely reflects sound rights-consciousness.
A WRM includes a Boston statute forbidding placing loaded guns within a house
or building-although on examination that appears to have been a manner of early fire
code and, amusingly, also requires unloading of cannons and mortars before they were
taken indoors.315 Eighteenth century firefighting apparently had some unusual risks.
309 CURTIS, supra note 303, at 5.
310 See id.
311 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
312 CORNELL, supra note 31, at 28-29.
313 CURTIS, supra note 303, at 47.
314 See SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 101 (1988). As Washington put it,
oaths would "distinguish friends from foes." Id. at 100.
315 CORNELL, supra note 31, at 28. For analysis of the ordinance, see Clayton E. Cramer,
Gun Safety Regulation in Early America, SHOTGUN NEwS, Nov. 1, 2004, at 18, available at
http://www.claytoncramer.com/popularmagazines.htm (follow "Gun Safety Regulation" hyper-
link). Muskets are uncommonly difficult to unload-an attachment must be screwed onto the
ramrod, twisted into the lead ball by sheer force, and the ball then drawn out. Many Bostonians
must have been leaving theirs loaded-and apparently, their private artillery caches as well-
which was making fire fighting more interesting than it needed to be.
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I have noted the key difficulty in defining the "civic right" approach, in that it
tends to conflate two different concepts: (1) tyranny will be impeded by a militia
system and (2) tyranny will be impeded by widespread arms ownership.316 We will
examine the practical aspects of each separately.
1. Practical Results of "Tyranny will be impeded by the militia"
We start with the assumption that the Second Amendment was meant solely to
ensure existence of a militia that could deter or impede a tyrannical government.
In application, this approach would-if it were to make any sense-follow the
outline laid out a century ago by Judge Cooley,317 viz. that there is an individual
right, meant to buttress the militia, but not limited to its enrolled members-since
the government may define who is in the militia, and thus the right would have no
value against abusive government if so limited. To argue that the result is that only
militia activities are covered is to lapse into the collective right approach, which
AWRM repudiates.318
If we take this definition, the civic right concept in practice resembles the "hybrid"
individual right, recognized in Aymette v. State.319 Presumably, a legislature can out-
law weapons that have no militia/military function. It can proscribe brass knuckles
and billy clubs because militia functions do not contemplate bludgeoning tyrants,
insurrectionaries, or criminals. Conversely, outlawing machine guns, assault rifles,
.50 caliber rifles, and the like would involve infringement of the right's very core.
A government could likely restrict concealed carry because concealment has no
particular link to political resistance, but it could not restrict open carry or use. It
could not forbid ownership of handguns because one of the traditional purposes of
the militia is law enforcement-"to execute the Laws of the Union."32 Indeed, law
enforcement was probably the most frequent use of the militia, its wartime use being
limited to the War of 1812 and minor roles in a few campaigns of the Civil War.32'
The first national "calling out" of the militia was for law enforcement-suppressing
the Whiskey Act Rebellion of 1793 32 -- and the most recent state "calling out" for the
316 See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.
317 See supra note 223 and accompanying text.
318 CORNELL, supra note 31, at 6, 212-14.
319 21 Tenn. (2 Hum.) 154 (1840); see also supra notes 237-42 and accompanying text.
320 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.15.
321 Militia forces were used extensively in the War of 1812. MIcHAELD. DOUBLER, CIVILIAN
IN PEACE, SOLDIER IN WAR: THE ARMY NATIONAL GUARD 1636-2000, at 82-85 (2003).
After the debacle at First Bull Run, other armies quickly made their regular troops reenlist
for three years. Id. at 101, 103.
322 George Washington's Proclamation Calling Out the Militia to Occupy the Western
Counties of Pennsylvania, CLAYPOOLE's DAILY ADVERTISER, Aug. 11, 1794, available at
http://www.earlyamerica.com/earlyamerica/milestones/whiskey.
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same purpose-suppressing a 1920 lynch mob that was comprised, paradoxically,
of National Guardsmen. 3
The one construction that is indefensible under this view would be "the right
to arms only covers members of a well-regulated militia." This is indefensible for
the reason given by Judge Cooley: only the government can create a well-regulated
militia, and hence a right limited to such a group would be of no value as a check
upon government.
2. Practical Results of "Tyranny will be impeded by an armed people"
If we take the second definition, then the core of the individual "civic right"
concept appears to be that individual persons have the right to keep and bear arms
for the purpose of-to take the words from Aymette v. State-"to keep in awe those
who are in power. 3 24 Just what legislation would pass this constitutional standard?
Certainly not the ban on civilian ownership of post-1986 machine guns.3125 Those
"in power" have millions of these at their disposal. And certainly not proposals for
bans on "assault weapons," their semiautomatic brethren. The civic rights only view
might, like the hybrid right view, permit banning a weapon because it was too in-
nocuous but not because it was too powerful.
Firearm permit systems? The concept of making a check upon governmental
abuses contingent upon obtaining a governmental permit does seem of dubious utility,
and it is unlikely to have been within the contemplation of the Framers.
Registration? This might be questionable. There is little to be said for regis-
tration alone as a crime fighting tool, 326 but handing the government a convenient
list of which citizen owns which firearms would certainly undermine any purpose
of deterring tyranny.
AWRM argues that some measures might pass muster-safe storage require-
ments, perhaps a modest tax on guns,327 or mandatory liability insurance, although
323 Mob's Rail on Jail is Broken Up by Troops, CLEv. ADvoc., Oct. 9, 1920, available at
http://armsandthelaw.com/archives/militia/index.php (Apr. 6, 2005, 11:16 EST) ("The jailer
refused to give up the prisoner and members of the State militia from Johnson City dispersed
the mob.").
324 21 Tenn. (1 Hum.) at 158.
325 18 U.S.C. § 922(o) (2000).
326 If there has been a crime solved by registration records, the author has not, in thirty years
of research, encountered it. An offender is unlikely to leave his gun with the victim or to permit
the victim to write down its serial number.
327 CORNELL, supra note 31, at 216-17. As to the tax, the Supreme Court has rejected appli-
cation of special taxes to news media. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minn. Comm'r of
Revenue, 460 U.S. 575 (1983). The same rationale would seemingly apply here: if a govern-
ment is to be checked by freedom of speech and arms, it cannot hold the power to burden either,
at will, with special taxes. There is the additional incongruity of basing a right on a citizen's
duty to serve the community and state and then taxing him when he makes ready to fulfill the
duty.
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one might wonder what could be covered.32 But on all major firearms issues, it
would seem that the "civic rights" approach would yield at least as broad a right as
would a purely individual right self-defense formulation.
CONCLUSION
The Framers and their contemporaries universally endorsed a right to arms, but
various Framers saw the right as serving various purposes. Some stressed the militia
system, some stressed the value of an armed people, some stressed self-defense and
many cited a combination of these. A Well-Regulated Militia does an excellent job
of outlining the first, but it omits evidence of the latter considerations or is forced
to try to reinterpret the considerable body of evidence that is inconsistent with its
thesis. It provides new insights into the American law of self-defense and other
aspects of American history, but it falls very short when it comes to analysis of early
caselaw and of the Fourteenth Amendment.
A Well-Regulated Militia does illustrate how the right to arms is an excellent
tool for teaching constitutional law.329 Most other constitutional provisions have
devolved, if we may dare say so, into a matter of reading a succession of cases-or
alternately, cramming the Law in a Nutshell series.330 Exploring the right to arms
requires consideration of historical materials, interpretative methodologies, varieties
of originalism, Fourteenth Amendment interpretation, and policy considerations. In
the case of the right to arms, we can see early nineteenth century courts grappling over
issues such as time, place, and manner restrictions that courts would not face, in any
other constitutional context, for another century. It is an ongoing dialogue, with room
for new additions. A WRM is the latest addition-the first in perhaps twenty years-to
this debate.
328 Homeowners' insurance would already cover most accidents; insurers would be un-
willing to cover intentional torts, and courts have rejected suits based on misuse by thieves.
See Romero v. Nat'l Rifle Ass'n of Am., 749 F.2d 77 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Rhodes v. R.G.
Indus., 325 S.E.2d 465,468 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984). See generally RESTATEMENT SECOND OF
TORTS § 315 (1965) ("There is no duty so to control the conduct of a third person as to prevent
him from causing physical harm to another.").
329 See Volokh et al., supra note 17, at 591-94.
330 See, e.g., JEROME A. BARRON & C. THOMAS DIENES, CONsTITUTIONAL LAW IN A
NUTSHELL (6th ed. 2005).
1284
